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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a) Statement Of The Case

On January 19, 2012, shortly after being sworn in as the Mayor of Sun Valley, DeWayne
Briscoe ("Defendant Briscoe" and the "Briscoe Administration") 1 terminated Appellant Sharon
R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer") as the Sun Valley City Administrator. The basis of this law suit is

that Ms. Hammer suffered through unwarranted disciplinary investigations, her termination, and
a fraudulent and unsuccessful attempt by Briscoe Administration officials to coerce the Blaine
County Prosecutor into filing criminal charges against Ms. Hammer, in retaliation for numerous
harassment claims she had made against former Sun Valley City Council member Nils Ribi
("Defendant Ribi")2, Defendant Briscoe's political ally, in violation of the Idaho Protection Of
Public Employees Act (Idaho Statute 6-2101 et seq.) (the "IPPEA") (Exhibit D herein). Ms.
Hammer, however, never got to present her case to a jury because summary judgment was
entered against her by the District Court, unrelated to her legitimate IPPEA claims.
Waiver: On January 23, 2012, in return for payment of "severance" described in her City
Administrator Employment Agreement (the "Employment Agreement") (Rec. 1023-1028,
1 Defendant Briscoe served as a member of the Sun Valley City Council from January of 2008 to January of 20 I0,
and as the President of the Sun Valley City Council from January of 20 IO to January of 2012. Defendant Briscoe has
served as the Mayor of Sun Valley from January of 2012 to current, but chose not to run for re-election in November
of 2015. Defendant Briscoe' s tenure as Mayor of Sun Valley ends (ended) the first week of January of 2016.
2 Defendant Ribi chose not to run for re-election to the Sun Valley City Council in November of 2013 after
Defendant Ribi's abusive conduct towards Ms. Hammer was made public.
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Exhibit

herein), Ms. Hammer supplied Sun Valley a Supplemental Release (Supp.Rec. 79,

Exhibit B herein) which reserved Ms. Hammer's rights to bring causes of action not intended to
be prospectively waived when she signed the Employment Agreement in 2008, including IPPEA
claims. The Supplemental Release did not waive "all claims" as had been demanded by Sun
Valley officials, nor does it even mention the IPPEA. Without seeking any further modifications
to the Supplemental Release, Briscoe Administration officials voluntarily paid Ms. Hammer the

"severance" anyway. Even though the Supplemental Release does not actually state so, the
Briscoe Administration has subsequently claimed that Ms. Hammer, none the less, waived "all
claims", including IPPEA claims, and convinced the District Court of that claim. Ms. Hammer
appeals that decision based on several factual and legal arguments, and requests this Court to
instead enter summary judgment in Ms. Hammer's favor that she did not waive IPPEA claims.
Post Termination Adverse Actions: Subsequent to her termination, and after the
submission of the Supplemental Release, Briscoe Administration officials continued their
retaliatory conduct against Ms. Hammer by seeking a fraudulent criminal investigation of Ms.
Hammer, commencing a forensic audit related to Ms. Hammer's conduct, and issuing numerous
public statements and press releases publicly denigrating Ms. Hammer. Almost a year after Ms.
Hammer's termination, the Blaine County Prosecutor finally put an end to the public criminal
allegations against Ms. Hammer by issuing a letter exonerating Ms. Hammer of any possible
criminal conduct (Rec. 430-434)3, because Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe themselves

3

Only the first five (5) pages of the Blaine County Prosecutor's letter of November 21, 2012 were included by Ms.
Hammer in the Record On Appeal as the remainder of the letter applies to other Sun Valley employees (against
whom false criminal allegations had also been made by Sun Valley officials) and matters unrelated to Ms. Hammer.
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had approved the same conduct that was asserted to be criminal. Ms. Hammer asserts that the
post-termination conduct of the Briscoe Administration is actionable under the IPPEA, even if
Ms. Hammer was found to have waived her claims to pre-termination relief under the IPPEA.
Judicial Estoppel: The District Court also entered summary judgment finding that Ms.
Hammer was judicially estopped from asserting that Sun Valley's termination of Ms. Hammer
"without cause" (i.e. at will) under provisions of the Employment Agreement was a pretext for
the numerous real reasons that Ms. Hammer was actually terminated, including in retaliation for
making harassment claims against Defendant Ribi. The judicial estoppel findings were made by
the District Court sua ~ponte. Ms. Hammer seeks that the judicial estoppel findings be reversed.
Individual Liability Under The IPPEA: The District Court also found that neither
Defendant Briscoe nor Defendant Ribi could be held personally liable under the IPPEA. Ms.
Hammer seeks the Court's determination that the language of the IPPEA and the legislative
history of the IPPEA provides for individual liability for municipal officials. As neither
Defendant Briscoe nor Defendant Ribi were specifically named in the Supplemental Release,
neither are entitled to claim that Ms. Hammer waived claims against either, individually.
Work Product Privileges: Prior to her termination, Ms. Hammer was subjected to a
retaliatory disciplinary investigation, commenced by Sun Valley at the urgings of Defendant Ribi
and Defendant Briscoe, performed by investigator Patricia Latham-Ball ("Investigator Ball" and
the "Ball Investigation"), during the last ten (10) weeks of former Sun Valley Mayor Wayne
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Willich's (''Former Mayor Willich" and the Willich Administration")4 tenure (i.e. November 9,
2011 to January 3, 2012 - the "Post Election Period")5. The District Court granted broad work
product protections to all communications related to the Ball Investigation, even though the
report(s) produced by Investigator Ball were published in toto in the Idaho Mountain Express
and extensively quoted from in the Boise Weekly. and several Sun Valley officials openly
discussed the Ball Investigation and the various reports issued by Investigator Ball in their
depositions. Ms. Hammer appeals the work product protection findings.
Attorney-Client Privileges: While still employed with Sun Valley, Ms. Hammer filed a
retaliation law suit against Defendant Ribi and Sun Valley under the IPPEA (the "Original
IPPEA Law Suit")6 and a federal harassment, retaliation and discrimination complaint against
Defendant Ribi and Sun Valley7 (the "Federal Law Suit"). Attorney Kirtlan Naylor ("Attorney
Naylor") was assigned to defend against those claims by Sun Valley's insurance company
("ICRMP"). Attorney Naylor's limited role as ICRMP's assigned counsel was to defend against
Ms. Hammer's law suits. Attorney Naylor obtained no written retainer agreement or other
4 Former Mayor Willich served as Mayor of Sun Valley from January of 2008 to January of 2012. Former Mayor
Willich lost the November of 2011 municipal election for Sun Valley Mayor to Defendant Briscoe by about 24
votes. Defendant Ribi endorsed Defendant Briscoe over Former Mayor Willich in the November of 2011 election.
5 As will be further detailed, at the end of the Ball Investigation, Former Mayor Willich exonerated Ms. Hammer of
any misconduct because everything she had been accused of had been approved by either Former Mayor Willich or
the Sun Valley City Council. Even though Former Mayor Willich's exoneration of Ms. Hammer was "final and
binding" pursuant to Section 8.7 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies (Rec. 174-175). the Briscoe Administration
ignored Former Mayor Willich's findings and re-investigated Ms. Hammer for the same misconduct allegations.
6 On November 21, 2011, Ms. Hammer filed a Complaint in Hammer v. Ribi, Sun Valley, et al., CV-2011-928
(Blaine County) asserting that Sun Valley's commencing the Ball Investigation and placing her on administrative
leave was in retaliation for her harassment complaints against Defendant Ribi, in violation of the IPPEA. The
Original IPPEA Law Suit was voluntarily dismissed with leave to reinstate on January 11, 2012.
7 In mid-December of 2011, Ms. Hammer filed a harassment, retaliation, and discrimination Complaint against
Defendant Ribi and Sun Valley with the Idaho Human Rights Commission ("IHRC") (Case. No. E-0112-241; 38C2012-00122). After the release of "right to sue'' letters by the IHRC and EEOC in 2013, Ms. Hammer filed a federal
Complaint for harassment and retaliation in Hammer v. Sun Valley, et al., i: i 3-cv-0021 i-EjL (U.S. Idaho).
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official direction expanding that limited authority. Yet, the District Court retroactively granted
Attorney Naylor broad attorney-client privileges for all Sun Valley related matters during the
Willich Administration. Ms. Hammer asserts that it was error to grant Attorney Naylor any
attorney-client privileges related to the Ball Investigation, which was commenced before any
litigation was commenced and before Attorney Naylor was appointed by ICRMP, and for which
Attorney Naylor obtained no authority to participate. Further, the Court will be required to
determine whether Attorney Naylor possessed a legitimate attorney-client relationship with Sun
Valley at all (as opposed to with Defendant Ribi) during the Post Election Period, considering
the conflict between Attorney Naylor' s representation of Defendant Ribi and Sun Valley in the
Original IPPEA Law Suit and the Federal Law Suit at the same time (without obtaining written
consent from all co-defendants as is required by I.R.P. C. I. 7(b )( 4 )), and Former Mayor Willich' s
rejection of Attorney Naylor as Sun Valley's attorney during the Post Election Period because of
those conflicts 8• Finally, the Court must not only consider the extent of authority granted to
Attorney Naylor by Sun Valley, but also the nature of Attorney Naylor's actions. To the extent
Attorney Naylor participated in Defendant Ribi's and Defendant Briscoe's retaliatory conduct
and false criminal accusations against Ms. Hammer, his actions fall outside the scope of privilege
under J.R.E. 501 (d)(I) (i.e. the crime fraud exception).

See Willich Compel Aff., Para. 61, Rec. 307, where Former Mayor Willich states: "I certify that from the moment
he was appointed by ICRMP as defense counsel in regards to the [Original IPPEA Law Suit], I considered Attorney
Naylor to have acted in contradiction to my directions and authority and to the best interest of Sun Valley, in favor
of his defense of Council Member Ribi and ICRMP, and therefore I never considered or recognized Attorney Naylor
to have been either Sun Valley's attorney or my personal attorney."
8
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(ii) Course Of The Proceedings
Ms. Hammer filed her Complaint on June 9, 2012 (Rec. 14-99) and her Amended
Complaint on December 27, 2012 (Rec. 100-186). On November 26, 2013, the District Court
entered its Order dismissing Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe (Rec. 567-575), and on
February 18, 2014 the District Court entered its Order denying reconsideration of its dismissal of
Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe (Rec. 793-795). On January 17, 2014, the District Court
entered its Order denying Ms. Hammer's Motion To Compel discovery related to the Ball
Investigation (Supp.Rec. 15-25), and on May 16, 2014 the District Court entered its Order
denying reconsideration of that ruling (Rec. 809-818). On January 12, 2015, the District Court
entered its Summary Judgment Order (Rec. 1507-1517) granting Sun Valley summary judgment,
and on June 8, 2015 the District Court entered its Order denying reconsideration of its entry of
summary judgment in Sun Valley's favor (Supp.Rec. 220).

(iii) Statement Of Facts
The Employment Agreement
The 2008 Employment Agreement (Rec.1023-1028) (Exhibit A herein) was prepared by
then Sun Valley City Attorney Rand Peebles. The Employment Agreement included a provision
(Section 3.A. of the Employment Agreement) (the "Severance Clause") that required that if Ms.
Hammer was ever terminated "without cause", she would be entitled to "severance" of six (6)
months of pay, but was required to provide a release to obtain the "severance". A sample of the
release was not attached to the Employment Agreement, nor was specific language of what was
supposed to be included in a release included in the Employment Agreement.

IO
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When the Employment Agreement was entered into, Ms. Hammer9 and Former Mayor
Willich 10 agreed that Ms. Hammer would not be required to waive any statutory claims, such as
IPPEA claims, unrelated to salary or other benefits, if she was ever terminated by Sun Valley
"without cause" and paid the "severance" described in the Employment Agreement.
The Legitimate Harassment Claims Of Ms. Hammer Against Defendant Ribi
For three year, Ms. Hammer was subjected to ever more hostile harassment and abuse
from Defendant Ribi 11 , including that Defendant Ribi assaulted Ms. Hammer in Sun Valley City
Hall in September of 2011 12 • The harassment was reported to numerous Sun Valley officials.
The gender based nature of the harassment of Ms. Hammer by Defendant Ribi was
confirmed by Former Mayor Willich 13 and former Sun Valley City Council member Joan
Lamb 14 ("Former Council Member Lamb") 15 • Section 7.5 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies
(Amended Complaint, Rec. 168-170) (the "Sun Valley Anti-Harassment Policy") prohibits
"harassment in any form (emphasis added)" and applies to Sun Valley City Council members.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "harassment" as "Repeated conduct that is not wanted and is
known to all parties as offensive", which describes Defendant Ribi's incessant, unwanted and
hostile conduct towards Ms. Hammer. Former Mayor Willich, a 30 year Boeing Co. executive,

Hammer Aff., Para. 3-11, Rec. 1016-1020; Hammer Recon. Aff., Para. 6-12, Supp.Rec. 84-92.
Willich IHRC AfL Para. 4. Rec. 661-672; Willich Aff., Para. 3-9, Rec. I 042-1044; and Willich Recon. Aff., Para.
4-11, Supp.Rec. 113-117.
11 Amended Complaint, Para. 43-119, Rec. 106-122.
12 Amended Complaint, Para. 120-128, Rec. 122-124.
13 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 13, Rec. 663-668: Willich Compel Atl, Para. 11, Rec. 294-297; Willich Dep .• Rec.
1178-1179, 1204.
14 Lamb Dep., Rec. 1362.
15 Former Council Member Lamb served as a Sun Valley City Council member from January of 2008 through
January of 2012.
9

10
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confirmed Defendant Ribi's harassment of Ms. Hammer 16 and stated "It's inappropriate, and it
was harassment ... I know what harassment looks like." 17 . Even Defendant Briscoe admitted
that, while he was the President of the Sun Valley City Council, he was aware of the harassment
complaints against Defendant Ribi back to early 2011, but did nothing about it because it was not
"my responsibility or authority to do so under the statutes or otherwise." 18 However, Sun Valley
City Attorney Adam King ("City Attorney King") advised that there was nothing that could be
done to Defendant Ribi because he was an elected official 19 •
On numerous occasions Former Mayor Willich confronted Defendant Ribi and told him
to cease his harassment of Ms. Hammer20 . Defendant Ribi's response to those demands was,
basically, "screw you" 21 . Defendant Ribi feigned any knowledge that Ms. Hammer had
previously made any harassment complaints against him 22 . However, Former Mayor Willich
specifically gave Defendant Ribi the Sun Valley Anti-Harassment Policy in September of 2010
because of the complaints made by Ms. Hammer2 3 . Considering that Former Mayor Willich,
Defendant Briscoe, Former Council Member Lamb, the Sun Valley Police Chief and City
Attorney King were all aware of Ms. Hammer's harassment complaints against Defendant Ribi,
it is inconceivable that Defendant Ribi himself was not aware of the harassment complaints
16

Willich Dep., Pg. 135, Line 20-21, Rec. 1204.
Willich Dep., Pg. 136, Line 2-3, Line 9, Rec. 1204.
18 Briscoe, Dep., Pg. 61, Line 8-9, Rec. 1233.
19 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 13. Rec. 663-668; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 11, Rec. 294-297; Willich Dep., Rec.
1205-1207.
20 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 8, 10, 14, Rec. 663-668; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 8, 10, 12, 77, Rec. 294-297, 311;
WillichDep.,Rec.1178-1179, 1190-1191, 1205.
21 Willich Dep., Pg. 139 Line 8-25 to Pg. I 40, Line I, Rec. 1205.
22 Ribi Orig. IPPEA TRO Aff., Para. 5, 12, Rec. 1124-1125; Ribi Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 7, Rec. 608; Ribi Dep.,
Rec. 1269.
23 Willich Dep., Rec. l 190-1191; Ribi Dep., Rec. 1270.
17
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against him, whether he acknowledged his misconduct or not.
Ms. Hammer's Legitimate Use Of Compensatory Time And A Sun Valley Auto
The false misconduct allegations against Ms. Hammer, first raised by Defendant Ribi
immediately after Defendant Briscoe defeated Former Mayor Willich in the November of 2011
municipal election, which commenced the Ball Investigation, and subjected Ms. Hammer to false
criminal allegations, related to her taking of compensatory time and using a Sun Valley auto.
The Sun Valley Personnel Policies specifically provides for compensatory time 24 ,
including, Section 4.8.B of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies 25 which describes that because
"exempt" employees (such as Ms. Hammer) were not entitled to overtime, they were allowed
flexible schedules from "week to week". In addition, Section 10.A of the Employment
Agreement26 allowed Former Mayor Willich to provide Ms. Hammer with benefits in excess of
the benefits provided to other Sun Valley employees, including authorizing her to take
compensatory time, which he confirmed he had 27 . Former Council Member Lamb confirmed that
the entire Sun Valley City Council was aware of, and authorized, Ms. Hammer to use
compensatory time, as she used it 28 .
As to the Sun Valley auto, pursuant to Section 1O.A of the Employment Agreement (Rec.
1023-1028, Exhibit A herein), Former Mayor Willich was authorized to provide Ms. Hammer

24 See Sections 1.2, 2.1, 3.9, 3.11, 4.8 and 5.1 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies (Rec. 137-186). In at least four
places the Sun Valley Personnel Policies uses the phrase "compensatory time" (see Section 4.8 and 5.1 of the Sun
Valley Personnel Policies). (Rec. 160-161 ).
25 Rec. 160.
26 Rec. I 023-1028, Exhibit A herein.
27 Willich Dep., Rec. 199-1201 and Willich Compel Aff., Para. 59, Rec. 307.
28 Lamb Dep., Pg. 30, Line 18 to Pg. 31, Line 13 and Pg. 41, Line 20-23, Rec. i 366.
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with the use of the Sun Valley auto, including for personal purposes, even if other Sun Valley
employees were not allowed such use 29 , which he confirmed he had 30 . Former Council Member
Lamb also confirmed that the entire Sun Valley City Council was aware of, and authorized, Ms.
Hammer to use the Sun Valley auto, including for personal purposes, twenty-four (24) hours a
day, during Ms. Hammer's entire tenure as the Sun Valley City Administrator31 •
The Retaliatory Misconduct Allegations Against Ms. Hammer, The Ball Investigation, The
Exoneration Of Ms. Hammer By Former Mayor Willich, And The Post Election Conduct Of Sun
Valley Officials
At a November 11, 2011 closed door Sun Valley City Council executive session, three
(3) days after Defendant Briscoe defeated Former Mayor Willich in the Sun Valley mayoral
election, Defendant Ribi accused Ms. Hammer of numerous acts of misconduct, including
"criminal" and "illegal" misconduct32 . Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe then demanded
. 34 .
.
. 3,·. M s. H ammer re fuse d to resign·
. . or res1gnat1on·
M s. H ammer , s termmat1on
Former Council Member Lamb confirmed that there was no need to investigate Ms.
Hammer for what she had been formally authorized to do, but that Defendant Ribi and Defendant
Briscoe had only one "agenda", which was to find any reason to terminate Ms. Hammer35 .
On November 14, 2011, the Sun Valley City Council passed a resolution ordering Former

29 It should be noted that Ms. Hammer was not just the Sun Valley City Administrator, but was a Sun Valley on-call
fire fighter and EMT, and used the Sun Valley auto to respond to those calls.
30 Willich Dep. Rec. 1175, 1197-1198 and Willich Compel Aff. Para. 59, Rec. 307.
31 Lamb Dep., Pg. 30, Line 18 to Pg. 31 Line 13, Pg. 41, Line 20-23, and Pg. 63, Line 7-9, Rec. 1364, 1366, 1372.
32 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 3, Rec. 673-675,Willich Dep., Rec. 1176-1178; Briscoe Dep., Rec. 1250; Ribi
Dep., Rec. 1284, 1295-1302; Lamb Dep., Rec. 1361.
33 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 14, Rec. 297-298; Willich Dep., Rec. 1176-1178, Lamb Dep., Rec. 1365, 1371.
34 Amended Complaint, Para. 135, Rec. 126.
35 Lamb Dep., Pg. 30, Line 18 to Pg. 31, Line 13, Rec. 1364; Lamb Dep., Pg. 37-38, Rec i365-1366.
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Mayor Willich to engage an investigator and to commence the Ball Investigation36 . Former
Mayor Willich thereafter hired Investigator Ball to perform a "fact finding" "independent
disciplinary investigation", solely looking into "violations of Sun Valley policy" 37 . Investigator
Ball was to report solely to Former Mayor Willich 38 .
On November 18, 2011, Ms. Hammer was placed on administrative leave 39 . On
November 21, 2011, in response to being subject to the Ball Investigation and being placed on
administrative leave, Ms. Hammer filed the Original IPPEA Law Suit40 . Immediately after the
filing of the Original IPPEA Law Suit, Defendant Ribi (through his initial private counsel Keith
Roark) filed an Affidavit in the Original IPPEA Law Suit accusing Ms. Hammer of unspecified
"illegal" and "criminal" acts, of "falsification of public records", and of "misuse of public funds
and equipment" 41 . The accusations were extensively quoted in the Idaho Mountain Express.
In response to Ms. Hammer filing the Original IPPEA Law Suit, Attorney Naylor was
appointed by ICRMP to defend Sun Valley, Defendant Ribi and City Attorney King 42 in the
Original IPPEA Law Suit43. City Attorney King was then directed to have nothing to do with the

Rec. 732-734.
Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff.• Para. 10-11, Rec. 675-677; Willich Ribi/Donoval Supp. Aff., Para. 16, Rec. 540;
Willich Compel Aff., Para. 18-22, 95; Rec. 298-299, 316; Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 12, Rec. 773; Willich
Dep., Rec. 1180-1185; Briscoe Dep., Rec. 1234-1235; Ribi Dep., Rec. 1288; Youngman Dep., Rec. 1325-1326.
1336; Lamb Dep., Rec. 1363. 1368; Rec. 323-324; Ball Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 6, Rec. 628.
38 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 15, Rec. 668; Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 12, Rec. 675-677; Willich Compel Aff.,
Para. 20, 23, Rec. 298-299; Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 14, Rec. 773; Willich Dep., Rec. 1180-1185, 1208.
39 Rec. 557; Hammer Orig. IPPEA TRO Aff., Para. 3, Rec. 553; King Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 13, Rec. 613.
40 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 15, Rec. 669; Donoval Ribi/Donoval SJ Aff., Para. 12, Rec. 705-706; Donoval Compel
Aff., Para. 2. Rec. 370.
41 Rec.1123-1127.
42 City Attorney King was named as a defendant in the Original IPPEA Law Suit because of his conduct in actively
seeking Ms. Hammer's termination during the Post Election Period. City Attorney King is not a defendant herein
43 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 15, Rec. 669; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 25, Rec. 300; Willich Dep., Rec. 1181-1183;
Naylor Aff., Para. 2, Rec. 602-606; King Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 17, Rec. 614.
36
37
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Investigation44 . Ms. Hammer's counsel ("Mr. Donoval" 45), requested written confirmation
as to Attorney Naylor's authority in regards to the Ball Investigation, but was not responded to 46 .
Although he held initial discussions with Attorney Naylor, Former Mayor Willich
concluded that Attorney Naylor had a conflict of interest in representing both Sun Valley and
Defendant Ribi in the Original IPPEA Law Suit47 . Former Mayor Willich demanded that ICMRP
assign Sun Valley a separate attorney, but was told by ICRMP personnel and Attorney Naylor
that he had no choice in the matter48 . Attorney Naylor told Former Mayor Willich that Attorney
Naylor worked for ICRMP, not Sun Valley49 .
Attorney Naylor never entered into a written retainer agreement with Sun Valley during
the Willich Administration. Former Mayor Willich has asserted that Attorney Naylor did so,

fraudulently, to later assert he had greater authority than he was ever granted50 . Attorney Naylor
appeared in the Original IPPEA Law Suit on behalf of both Sun Valley and Defendant Ribi
without obtaining written confirmation from both, in violation of I.R.P. C. 1. 7(b )( 4 ), and failed to
communicate with Former Mayor Willich in regards to pleadings or matters in the Original
IPPEA Law Suit during the remainder of the Willich Administration, violating I.R.P. C. 1.451 •
Former Mayor Willich advised Attorney Naylor he was not to have anything to do with

Willich Supp.Comp. Aff., Para. 11, Rec. 771-772; King Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 15, Rec. 614.
Mr. Donoval is also Ms Hammer·s husband.
46 Rec. 379-381; Donoval Compel Aff., Para. 3, Rec. 370.
47 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 61, 67, 73,78, Rec. 310-312; Willich Dep., Rec. 1181.
48 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 19-20, Rec. 678-679; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 36-37, Rec. 302-303; Willich
Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 13, Rec. 773.
49 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 19-20, Rec. 678-679; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 36-37, Rec. 302-303; Willich
Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 13, Rec. 773.
50 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 62, Rec. 307-308.
51 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 63-65, 86, Rec. 308-309, 314; Willich Dep., Rec. i 191.
44
45
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the Ball Investigation, other than that he could read the report prepared by Investigator Ball when
it was complete52 . The Sun Valley City Council also provided no authority to Attorney Naylor to
provide any direction to Investigator Ball or to be involved in the Ball Investigation53 .
Former Mayor Willich expanded the Ball Investigation to include a) Ms. Hammer's
harassment allegations against Defendant Ribi, b) a review of expenditures in the Sun Valley
Fire Department, and, c) misconduct and financial mismanagement allegations of former Sun
Valley Treasurer Michelle Frostenson ("Former Treasurer Frostenson")5 4 . During the Ball
Investigation, Ms. Hammer was only cursorily interviewed, and not allowed to rebut anything
related to the Ball Investigation in order to defend herself5 5 .
Unknown to Former Mayor Willich, Attorney Naylor and Investigator Ball held at least
sixty-eight (68) unauthorized one-on-one communications 56 between November 23, 2011 and
when Investigator Ball's report was completed on December 12, 2011 57 . The report (the
"Original Ball/Naylor Report"), prepared jointly by Attorney Naylor and Investigator Ball 58 , was
presented to Former Mayor Willich59 on December 12, 2011. Former Mayor Willich considered

52 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 15, Rec. 677-678; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 26-27, 72, Rec. 299-300, 310:
Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 13, Rec. 772-773; Willich Dep., Rec. 1183.
53 Youngman Dep., Rec. 1328.
54 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff.. Para. 16, Rec. 677-678; Willich Compel Aff.. Para. 32-33. Rec. 301-302; Briscoe
Dep .. Rec. 1226, 1236, 1246; Ribi Dep., Rec. 1284-1285, 1305; Ball Ribi/Donoval Aff.. Para. 10. Rec. 629.
55 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 16-17, Rec. 670-671; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 46, Rec. 304; Lamb Dep., Rec. 1372.
56 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 15-16, Rec. 669-671; Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 17-18, 21, 25. Rec. 677-681;
Willich Supp. Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 15, Rec. 539-540; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 34-35, 38-40, 47, 94, Rec.
302-305, 315-316; Willich Dep., Rec. 1181-1186.
57 See Privilege Log (Rec. 502-517) and Investigator Ball's Invoice (Rec. 326-329).
58 Although only Investigator Ball put her name on the Original Ball/Naylor Report, considering the extensive
communications between Investigator Ball and Attorney Naylor during the November 24, 2011 to December 12,
2011 period, there is no question that Attorney Naylor was actively participating in the writing of the Original
Ball/Naylor Report.
59 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 22, Rec. 679-681; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 41-43, Rec. 303-304.
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Original Ball/Naylor Report, to have been improperly influenced by Attorney Naylor, to be
not "credible", "junk" and an "attack piece" seeking to prosecute Ms. Hammer, and to exonerate
Defendant Ribi of "serious" claims against Defendant Ribi, instead of being an independent
report 60 . Former Mayor Willich ordered that the Original Ball/Naylor Report be kept under lock
and key at City Attorney King's office, and not publicly released 61 •
Based on his own knowledge, and the fact that both he and the Sun Valley City Council
had known of, and approved of, Ms. Hammer's use of compensatory time and the Sun Valley
auto even for personal purposes, Former Mayor Willich exonerated Ms. Hammer of any
misconduct62 , and provided Ms. Hammer with written confirmation of such 63 . Former Mayor
Willich's determination exonerating Ms. Hammer was "final and binding" pursuant to Section
8.7 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies 64. Former Mayor Willich determined that all matters
related to allegations of misconduct against Ms. Hammer were concluded and final 65 , and
informed Ms. Hammer in writing that all disciplinary matters related to her were "closed" 66 .
Former Mayor Willich advised Investigator Ball that she was "done" in regards to all matters

60

Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 23-25, Rec. 679-681; Willich Compel. Aff.. Para. 40, 48, Rec. 303, 305; Willich
Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 14, Rec. 773; Willich Dep., Rec. 1184.
61 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 22, Rec. 679-681; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 56-58, Rec. 306-307; Willich
Supp. Compel Aff.. Para. 14. Rec. 773; Willich Dep., Rec. 1186; Briscoe Dep., Rec. 1227; Lamb Dep., Rec. 1369.
62 Willich IHRC Aff.. Para. 16, Rec. 670-671; Willich Ribi/Donoval, Para. 23-24, Rec. 680; Willich Supp.
Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 10, Rec. 538; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 50, 59, 84, Rec. 305,307,313; Willich Dep.,
Rec. 1187; Hammer Orig. IPPEA Aff, Para. 9-12, Rec. 554-556; Hammer Orig. IPPEA TRO Aff., Para. 13, Rec.
647; Youngman Dep., Rec. 1333.
63 Rec. 565; Hammer Orig. IPPEA Aff., Para. 9-12, Rec. 554-556.
64 Rec. 174-175; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 3, 59, Rec. 294,307.
65 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff.. Para. 24, Rec. 680; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 84, Rec. 313.
66 Rec. 665; Hammer Orig. IPPEA Aff., Para. iO, Rec. 555.
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related to Ms. Hammer67 . Former Mayor Willich returned Ms. Hammer to active duty as the Sun
Valley City Administrator68 , and completed Ms. Hammer's annual review which provided her
with the highest ratings in all categories 69 . Former Mayor Willich concluded that Ms. Hammer
could not possibly have been considered to have done anything "criminal" based on taking
compensatory time or using the Sun Valley auto, because it had been approved by himself and
the Sun Valley City Council itself7°.
Based on his knowledge of how Defendant Ribi had treated Ms. Hammer over the course
of 2009 through 2011, Former Mayor Willich also ruled that Defendant Ribi violated the Sun
Valley Anti-Harassment Policy in his actions towards Ms. Hammer71 . Former Mayor Willich's
determination that Defendant Ribi violated the Sun Valley Anti-Harassment Policy was also a
"final and binding" decision pursuant to Section 8. 7 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies 72 .
On December 16, 2011, Former Mayor Willich met with Attorney Naylor at Attorney
Naylor's office in Boise 73 . At that meeting, Former Mayor Willich did not consider Attorney
Naylor to be either his or Sun Valley's attorney, nor did he consider that he was receiving any

Willich Supp. Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 8, Rec. 537; Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff.. Para. 27, Rec. 681; Willich
Compel Aff., Para. 52-55, Rec. 306; Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 16, Rec. 774; Willich Dep .. Rec. 1186.
68 Rec. 558; Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 16, Rec. 670-671; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 83, Rec. 313: Willich Dep.,
Rec. 1187; Hammer Orig, IPPEA Aff, Para. 7, Rec. 554; Hammer Orig. IPPEA TRO Aff., Para. 12, Rec. 555;
Youngman Dep., Rec. 1333.
69 Rec. 559-564; Hammer Orig. IPPEA Aff., Para. 8, Rec. 554.
70 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 50, 79, Rec. 305,312; Hammer Orig. TRO Aff., Para. 13, Rec. 647.
71 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 17, Rec. 671; Willich Supp. Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 7, 12, Rec. 537-539; Willich
Compel Aff., Para. 46, Rec. 304.
72 Rec. 174-175; Willich Supp. Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 12, Rec. 538-539.
73 Ms. Hammer requests the Court to read the entire Affidavit Of Former Mayor Willich in support of the Motion To
Compel (Rec. 293-368) as it provides a chronological description of events between November 8, 2011 and January
3, 2012, including extensive detail of Former Mayor Willich's December 16, 2011 meeting with Attorney Naylor.
67
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legal advice from Attorney Naylor74 . Former Mayor Willich told Attorney Naylor that he was
not the attorney for the Bali Investigation and that all matters related to Ms. Hammer were
finished 75 . Former Mayor Willich did agree that administrative leave notices should be provided
to several Sun Valley employees still on administrative leave (including Ms. Hammer), but did
not consider that by doing so he was receiving legal advice from Attorney Naylor76 .
At the December 16, 2011 meeting, Attorney Naylor aggressively sought to convince
Former Mayor Willich that Ms. Hammer should be criminally investigated by the Blaine County
Prosecutor, to which Former Mayor Willich replied:
"I told Attorney Naylor that doing so was not part of his job in defending against the
[Original IPPEA Law Suit]. I told Attorney Naylor that nothing that Former
Administrator Hammer had done could possibly be considered to have been "criminal"
because everything that she had been accused of had either been approved by myself or
the Sun Valley City Council. However, I told Attorney Naylor that if he found anything
that he could convince me of was "criminal" related to Sun Valley employees, that I
would allow him to turn over the information to the Blaine County Prosecutor. Attorney
Naylor gave me the document attached as Exhibit E (Rec. 334), which he said he would
keep in his files if he ever needed it, which I signed. However, I told Attorney Naylor that
I expected him to obtain my specific approval before he turned over documents to the
Blaine County Prosecutor. In addition, I specifically told Attorney Naylor that he was not
to provide the [Original Ball/Naylor Report] that I directed stay in City Attorney King's
possession at City Attorney King's Ketchum, Idaho office to the Blaine County
Prosecutor under any circumstances because of its multitude of flaws, errors and
unauthorized and unwarranted conclusions." (Willich Compel Aff., Para. 79, Rec. 312)
Former Mayor Willich acknowledged that several matters, unrelated to Ms. Hammer77 ,
including serious allegations of financial misconduct against Former Treasurer Frostenson and
74

Willich Compel. Aff., Para. 67-68, Rec. 309.
Willich Compel Aff., Para. 75, Rec. 310.
76 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 81, Rec. 312-313.
77 Ms. Hammer emphasizes this because she asserts that Investigator Ball and Attorney Naylor purposefully
disregarded Former Mayor Willich's instructions that all matters related to Ms. Hammer (as opposed to other Sun
Valley issues) were complete as of December 13, 2011.
75
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with the Sun Valley Fire Department, needed further investigation, but that Former Mayor
Willich would not have time to complete those matters during the remainder of his term 78.
Between December 13, 2011 and December 20, 2011, without Former Mayor Willich's
knowledge or approval, Attorney Naylor and Investigator Ball surreptitiously held at least
twenty eight (28) one-on-one communications 79 , and jointly prepared a revised version of the
Original Ball/Naylor Report (the "Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report") 80 which included new
facts and findings related to Ms. Hammer81 • After December 13, 2011, until the end of Former
Mayor Willich's term of office, Attorney Naylor had no further communications with Former
Mayor Willich, nor was Former Mayor Willich ever made privy to the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor
Report until Former Mayor Willich viewed the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report in the on-line
section of the Idaho Mountain Express a year later82 . The only communications in the Record On
Appeal between Former Mayor Willich are two emails in the Privilege Log purportedly from
Former Mayor Willi ch to Investigator Ball and City Attorney King on December 22, 2011 83 ,
which Fonner Mayor Willich has not been allowed to review and will not vouch for 84 .
Still during the Willich Administration, and without Former Mayor Willich's
Willich Orig. IPPEA Testimony, Rec. 656-657; Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 26, Rec. 681; Willich Compel
Aff., Para. 45, 76-77, 81, 85, Rec. 304, 311-314; Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 16-17, Rec. 774-775; Willich
Dep., Rec. 1211.
79 See Privilege Log (Rec. 502-517) and Investigator Balrs Invoice (Rec. 326-329).
80 As was the case with the Original Ball/Naylor Report, although Attorney Naylor's name is not on the
Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report, considering the extent of communications between [nvestigator Ball and Attorney
Naylor during the week it was being prepared, there is no question that Attorney Naylor was co-authoring the
Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report.
81 Willich Supp. Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 5-6, 13-16, Rec. 535-537, 539-540; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 89-95,
Rec. 314-315; Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 16-17, Rec. 774-775.
82 Willich Supp. Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 2-3, Rec. 535-537; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 87-88, Rec. 314-315;
Briscoe Orig. IPPEA Aff., Para. 6, Rec. 636.
83 Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 7, Rec. 771.
84 Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 7-10, Rec. 770-771.
78
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authorization and in disregard for Former Mayor Willich's explicit directions, Attorney Naylor
contacted the Blaine County Prosecutor and/or provided the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report to
the Blaine County Prosecutor, seeking that a criminal investigation of Ms. Hammer be
commenced 85 . The Sun Valley City Council gave Attorney Naylor no authority to tum over the
Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report to the Blaine County Prosecutor during the Post Election
Period, nor did the Sun Valley City Council authorize Attorney Naylor to seek a criminal
investigation of Ms. Hammer during the Post Election Period 86 . He did so none-the-less.
The Termination Of Ms. Hammer
On January 3, 2012, Defendant Briscoe was sworn in as the new Mayor of Sun Valley 87 .
The next day, Defendant Briscoe issued notices to Ms. Hammer that she was being placed on
administrative leave a second time, and that she was the target of a second disciplinary
investigation 88 . At the time, Ms. Hammer was provided no notice of what prompted the second
disciplinary investigation or the second administrative leave 89 . Six (6) days later, on January 9,
2012, Defendant Briscoe filed an Affidavit in the Original IPPEA Law Suit90 asserting that
Defendant Briscoe was re-investigating Ms. Hammer for the same allegations she had already

The Blaine County Prosecutor confirmed that "in December of 2011 (emphasis added)", still during the Willich
Administration, he was contacted by "ICRMP attorney (emphasis added) Kirtlan Naylor to initiate a criminal
investigation". (Rec. 430-434) At a January 11, 2012 hearing in the Original IPPEA Law Suit, Attorney Naylor
confirmed that the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report was turned over to the Blaine County Prosecutor seeking that
Ms. Hammer be criminally investigated (1/11/12 Transcript, Rec. 386; Donoval Compel Aff., Para. 5, Rec. 371).
86 Lamb Dep., Rec. 1371.
87 Amended Complaint, Para. 145, Rec. 127.
88 Rec. 957-958; Rec. 959-960; Hammer Orig. IPPEA TRO Aff., Para. 14, Rec. 647.
89 Hammer Orig, IPPEA TRO Aff., Para. 14, Rec. 647.
90 Rec. 635-639.
85
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exonerated of by Former Mayor Willich associated with the Ball Investigation9 1• Defendant
Briscoe also asserted that he was investigating Ms. Hammer for her actions between December
27, 2011 and January 3, 2012, when she still reported to Former Mayor Willich.
Between January 5, 2012 and January 19, 2012, the Sun Valley City Council held three
closed door executive sessions totaling twelve (12) hours, in which the misconduct allegations
against Ms. Hammer, and Ms. Hammer's fate, were extensively discussed 92 . On January 11,
2012, Attorney Naylor disclosed to the District Court in the Original IPPEA Law Suit that he and
the Briscoe Administration were seeking that Ms. Hammer be criminally investigated 93 . Attorney
Naylor also confirmed that, in regards to Ms. Hammer, he, personally, was "going to make sure
she [Ms. Hammer] was criminally prosecuted and that her career would be ruined." 94 On January
18, 2012, the day before Ms. Hammer's termination, Attorney Naylor told Mr. Donoval that the
Briscoe Administration would never retain Ms. Hammer as the Sun Valley City Administrator
because she had sued Defendant Ribi and Sun Valley for Defendant Ribi's harassment95 .
On January 19, 2012, Defendant Briscoe and the Sun Valley City Council jointly
terminated Ms. Hammer pursuant to Section 3.A of the Employment Agreement (Rec. 1023-

Even though Section 8.7 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies (Rec. 174-175) specifically states that all
disciplinary decisions of the Mayor of Sun Valley are "final and binding''. the Briscoe Administration has asserted
that Former Mayor Willich's exoneration of Ms. Hammer for misconduct allegations raised by Defendant Ribi and
which were the subject of the Ball Investigation were not "final and binding" because the Ball Investigation was not
completed, and that the Briscoe Administration could continue to pursue further disciplinary and criminal
rroceedings against Ms. Hammer based on the same misconduct allegations.
2 Briscoe Dep., Rec. 1218-1264; Ribi Dep., Rec. 1266-1312; Youngman Dep., Rec. 1314-1337; Suhadolnik Dep.
Rec. 1339-1354.
93 1/11/12 Transcript, Rec. 386; Donoval Compel Aff., Para. 5, Rec. 371.
94 Donoval Compel. Aff., Para. 6, Rec. 371.
95 Donoval Reconsider Aff., Para. 14, Supp.Rec. 33; Supp.Rec. 57.
91
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1028; Exhibit A herein) 96 (i.e. "without cause"). However, Defendant Ribi and Defendant
Briscoe had previously made clear that they wanted Ms. Hammer terminated based on
misconduct allegations. Sun Valley City Council Member Franz Suhadolnik ("Council Member
Suhadolnik") admitted that he also voted to terminate Ms. Hammer because of evidence that she
must have done something wrong 97 , and the next day issued a letter to Ms. Hammer asserting
that she had made "mistakes" 98 . Defendant Ribi admitted in his deposition that legal counsel
(presumably Attorney Naylor) advised the Briscoe Administration that Ms. Hammer could be
terminated "without cause", even while the Briscoe Administration was publicly asserting she
was guilty of misconduct, including criminal misconduct99 .
The day after Ms. Hammer's termination, the Briscoe Administration published a paid for
Press Release advertisement in the Idaho Mountain Express, authored by Attorney Naylor,
announcing that Sun Valley was seeking that Ms. Hammer be criminally investigated 100 . On
January 25, 2012, the Briscoe Administration also published in the Idaho Mountain Express
another paid ad (also authored by Attorney Naylor), announcing that Ms. Hammer was
terminated pursuant to Section 3 .A of the Employment Agreement, without mentioning that she
was actually terminated "without cause" 101 • The advertisements implied to the public that the
Briscoe Administration had actually terminated Ms. Hammer because of criminal allegations.

96

Rec. 962-966.
See Council Member Suhadolnik's testimony (Suhadolnik Dep., Pg. 28, Line 6 to Pg. 34, Line 8, Rec. 13461348). Council Member Suhadolnik states: 'The allegations were consistent and strong that there was at least
numerous violations of the city personnel policy." (Suhadolnik, Dep .. Pg. 28, Line 25 to Pg. 29, Line 3, Rec. 1346).
98 Suhadolnik Dep., Pg. 42, Line I to Pg. 49, Line 13, Rec. 1350-1351.
99 Ribi Dep., Pg. 91, Line 5-7, Rec. 1289.
100 Rec. 961; Briscoe Dep., Pg. 144, Line 22 to Pg. 145, Line 24, Rec. 1254.
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The Submission Of The Supplemental Release And The Payment Of The "Severance"
Upon Ms. Hammer being placed on administrative leave for a second time by the Briscoe
Administration, Mr. Donoval submitted to Attorney Naylor at least three written
communications (see Group Exhibit C herein) 102 , and held a telephone conference with Attorney
Naylor 103, related to Ms. Hammer's termination and the payment of the "severance" described in
the Employment Agreement. Mr. Donoval made clear to Attorney Naylor that even if the Briscoe
Administration paid Ms. Hammer the "severance" described in the Employment Agreement, she
would not be waiving any non service, salary or benefit type of claims. The day before Ms.
Hammer's termination, Mr. Donoval wrote to Attorney Naylor:
"The causes of action Ms. Hammer possesses for tort, including the underlying
harassment allegations against Council Member Ribi and several other claims, do not
arise "from termination", they arise out of separate incidents. Nor is it rational to assert
that Ms. Hammer would have waived any non-contract damage claims she would have
prospectively been entitled to (personal injury claims) when she signed the agreement. So
as I have stated, if the City Of Sun Valley proposes to terminate Ms. Hammer without
cause and pays her the severance payment in the contract, she will only sign a waiver that
states the exact language in the contract cited above and nothing more." (Supp.Rec. 60)
On January 20, 2012, the day after her termination, Ms. Hammer issued a letter to Sun
Valley, demanding payment of the "severance" required by the Employment Agreement, and
included a signed release which mirrors language from the Employment Agreement (the
"Original Hammer Release") (see Group Exhibit C herein) 104 •
On January 20, 2012 and January 21, 2012, Attorney Naylor submitted three emails to
Mr. Donoval. The first email, rejected the Original Hammer Release and demanded that Ms.
Rec. 1036, Supp. Rec. 53, Supp.Rec. 59-61.
Donoval Recon. Aff., Para. 14, Supp.Rec. 33.
104 Supp.Rec. 63-65.
102

103
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Hammer include language of "I release all claims against the City Of Sun Valley" in a signed
release, or the Briscoe Administration would not pay the "severance" described in the
Employment Agreement (see Group Exhibit C herein) 105 . The second email confirmed that if
Ms. Hammer did not include the "all claims" language in a release, the Briscoe Administration
would not pay Ms. Hammer the "severance" described in the Employment Agreement (see
Group Exhibit C herein) 106 . The third email reiterated that Ms. Hammer must include the "all
claims" language in a signed release, and included a release drafted by Attorney Naylor (the
"Naylor Drafted Release"), which also included the "I release all claims ... against the City of
Sun Valley" language Attorney Naylor demanded be included in a release or the Briscoe
Administration would not pay Ms. Hammer the "severance" described in the Employment
Agreement (see Group Exhibit C) 107 •
Ms. Hammer rejected the Naylor Drafted Release, or the inclusion of the "all claims"
language demanded by Attorney Naylor, and instead submitted the signed Supplemental Release
(Exhibit B herein) to Attorney Naylor and Former Treasurer Frostenson 108 , which included the
specific language that Ms. Hammer was only releasing "any claims defined in Section 3.A. of
the City Administrator Employment Agreement as were intended when the City Administrator

Employment Agreement was entered into on June 1, 2008 (emphasis added)" (the "Conditional
Clause") 109 . No further communications were received from Attorney Naylor.

105

Rec. 1488.
Supp.Rec. 69.
107 Supp.Rec. 71-72.
108 Supp.Rec. 78-79.
109 Hammer SJ Aff., Para. 19-21, Rec. l Ol 9- 1020; Hammer Recon. Aff., Para. i 8-24, Supp. Rec. 89-90.
106
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At a January 23, 2012 meeting at Sun Valley City Hall, Former Treasurer Frostenson
acknowledged to Mr. Donoval that the entire "severance" payment to be made to Ms. Hammer
related solely to past services, wages and benefits, and none of the "severance" was related to
any non wage types of claims of Ms.Hammer 110 . Based on Former Treasurer Frostenson's
confirmation that none of the about to be paid "severance" payment related to any non service or
wage types of claims, Mr. Donoval approved the withholding of employment taxes on the entire
"severance" payment, which would not have been required for non-wage types of payments 111 •
Without fmther communications from any Sun Valley officials, on January 24, 2012, the
"severance" payment was direct deposited into Ms. Hammer's Chase Bank checking account' 12 .
There is no evidence in the Record On Appeal that any Sun Valley official, other than Attorney
Naylor and Former Treasurer Frostenson, were ever made aware of the actual specific language
of the Supplemental Release or that the Supplemental Release did not include the "all claims"
language that had been demanded by Attorney Naylor. Nor is there any evidence in the Record
On Appeal of who made the decision to pay Ms. Hammer the "severance" the next day, or why.

Donoval Reconsider Aff., Para. 29-32, Supp.Rec. 36-37.
Supp.Rec. 81; Donoval Reconsider Aff., Para. 29-32. Supp.Rec. 36-37.
112 Rec. 83; Hammer Recon. Aff., Para. 25, Rec. 9i.
110

111
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by entering summary judgment against Ms.
Hammer, and in particular in finding that the Ms. Hammer had waived any rights to proceed
against Sun Valley pursuant to the provisions of the IPPEA, by submitting the Supplemental
Release on January 23, 2012 in order to receive contractual "severance" benefits described in the
Employment Agreement Ms. Hammer entered into with Sun Valley on or about June 1, 2008?
II) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by failing to recognize that Ms. Hammer had a
cause of action under the IPPEA for adverse actions taken by Briscoe Administration officials
after Ms. Hammer's termination and after Ms. Hammer supplied the Supplemental Release to
Briscoe Administration officials on January 23, 2012?

III) Did the District Court err as a matter of law in entering summary judgment against Ms.
Hammer by finding that judicial estoppel barred Ms. Hammer from raising any claims against
Sun Valley under the provisions of the IPPEA?
IV) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by finding that personal liability does not attach
to Defendant Ribi or Defendant Briscoe under the IPPEA?
V) Did the District Court err as a matter of law that Sun Valley, Investigator Ball and Attorney
Naylor possessed attorney-client and work product privileges related to the Ball Investigation,
and the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report, which was released to the public?
VI) Did the District Court err in entering costs against Ms. Hammer?

ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
Ms. Hammer seeks attorneys' fees on appeal, pursuant to I.A.R. 41, and pursuant to Idaho

Statute 6-2106(5) which provides for attorney's fees to a successful litigant under the IPPEA.
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ARGUMENT
ISSUE I) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by entering summary judgment
against Ms. Hammer, and in particular in finding that Ms. Hammer had waived any rights
to proceed against Sun Valley pursuant to the provisions of the IPPEA, by submitting the
Supplemental Release on January 23, 2012 in order to receive contractual "severance"
benefits described in the Employment Agreement Ms. Hammer entered into with Sun
Valley on or about June 1, 2008?
Summary Judgment In General
The entry of summary judgment at the district court level is reviewed on appeal by this
Court de novo, AED, Inc. v. KDC Investments, LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 307 P.3d 176 (Id. Sup.Ct.
2013 ), with this Court exercising free review in determining whether any genuine issues of
material fact exist and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Miller

v. Simonson, 140 Idaho 287, 289, 92 P.3d 537 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2004). De Novo generally means a
new hearing or a hearing for the second time, Beker Industries, Inc. v. Georgetown Irr. Dist., 101
Idaho 187,190,610 P.2d 546 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1980), requiring that none of a district court's findings
related to the summary judgment are to be taken into consideration on appeal. In fact, in Roe v.

Albertson's, Inc., 141 Idaho 524,527, 112 P.3d 812 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2005) this Court stated that
"because our review is de novo, providing summary judgment transcripts that contained the
parties' arguments is not necessary for appellate review."
On appeal, this Court's determination of whether summary judgment should be entered is
the same as that required of the district court itself when originally ruling on the summary
judgment motion (Roe v. Albertson's, 527). Thus, summary judgment should only be granted
where the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show there is no genuine issues as to any material fact and the petitioner is entitled to a judgment
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as a matter of law, l.R.C.P. 56(c); Shapley v. Centurion L~fe Ins. Co., 154 Idaho 875,877,303
P.3d 234 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2013). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact rests with the moving party, Harris v. State, 147 Idaho 401,405, 210 P.3d 86 (Id.
Sup.Ct. 2009). In determining whether the burden has been met, any disputed material facts are
to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and this Court must make all
reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the motion, McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,
769,820 P.2d 360 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1991). In Crane v. Banner, 93 Idaho 69, 73-74, 455 P.2d 313 (Id.
Sup.Ct. 1969), this Court emphasized that "this Court has repeatedly stated that upon a motion
for summary judgment all doubts (emphasis added) are to be resolved against the moving party."
In Sutton v. Brown, 85 Idaho 104, 109, 375 P.2d 990 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1962) this Court stated:
"fact allegations contained in an affidavit opposing a motion for summary judgment must be

accepted as true (emphasis added)."
The Legal Standards Regarding Waiver
In the 2011 case of Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449,259 P.3d 595 (Id.
Sup.Ct. 2011), Justice Burdick detailed the Idaho Supreme Court's definition of "waiver".
In Knipe Land v. Robertson, in summarizing several previous Idaho cases, Justice Burdick wrote:
"A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage, and
the party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in reasonable reliance upon it and
that he thereby has altered his position to his detriment. Waiver is foremost a question of
intent. A clear intention to waive must be shown before waiver shall be established.
Waiver will not be inferred except from a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent
to waive, or from conduct amounting to estoppel. Waiver is a mixed question of law and
fact. First a court must find the facts alleged to constitute waiver are true. Second, the
court must decide whether, if true, those facts suffice as a matter of law to show waiver."
(Knipe Land v. Robertson, @457-458) (internal citations omitted).
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The Court should also adopt the language of the Missouri Appellate Court in Frisella
RVB Corp., 979 S.W.2d 474,477 (Mo. App.E.D. 1998) regarding waiver, namely:
"To rise to the level of waiver, the conduct must be manifestly consistent with and
indicative of an intention to renounce a particular right or benefit that no other reasonable
explanation of the conduct is possible."
This Court has stated that the existence of waiver "is foremost a question of intent. In
order to establish waiver the intention to waive must clearly appear" on the document purporting
to be a waiver itself, Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839
P.2d 1192 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1992). And, this Court has directed that if there is any substantial
evidence in the record" regarding the existence or non existence of a waiver, "it is for the trier of
fact" (i.e. a jury) to determine whether the evidence establishes a waiver or not, Riverside
Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,519,650 P.2d 657 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1982).

The Legal Standards Regarding Ambiguity
Knipe Land v. Robertson also described this Court's definition of whether a document is
"ambiguous", thus requiring extrinsic evidence to be used to determine the intent of the parties.
In Knipe Land v. Robertson, Justice Burdick, in summarizing several Idaho cases, described that:
"When interpreting a contract, this Court begins with the document's language. In the
absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper
sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument.
Interpreting an unambiguous contract and determining whether there has been a violation
of that contract is an issue of law subject to free review. A contract term is ambiguous
when there are two different reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsensical.
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, but interpreting an ambiguous term
is an issue of fact.
Whether an ambiguity exists in a legal instrument is a question of law, over which this
Court exercises free review. Where a legal instrument is found to be unambiguous the
legal effect must be decided by the district court as a matter of law; it is only when the
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instrument is found to be ambiguous that evidence as to the meaning of that instrument
may be submitted to the trier of fact
There are two types of ambiguity, patent and latent. A patent ambiguity is an ambiguity
clear from the face of the instrument in question. Idaho courts look solely to the face of a
written agreement to determine whether it is patently ambiguous ... A latent ambiguity
exists where an instrument is clear on its face, but loses that clarity when applied to the
facts as they exist. Although parol evidence generally cannot be submitted to contradict,
vary, add or subtract from the terms of a written agreement that is deemed unambiguous
on its face, there is an exception to this general rule where a latent ambiguity appears.
Where the facts in existence reveal a latent ambiguity in a contract, the court seeks to
determine what the intent of the parties was at the time they entered into the contract."
Knipe Land v. Robertson, @454-455) (internal citations omitted).

The Supplemental Release
On January 23, 2012, Ms. Hammer submitted the Supplemental Release to Attorney
Naylor and Briscoe Administration officials 113 , which stated, in its entirety, as follows:
SUPPLEMENTAL RELEASE PURSUANT TO CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT
"Upon payment of the severance payment required pursuant to section 3.A of the City
Administrator Employment Agreement dated June I, 2008, I release the City Of Sun Valley
for any claims defined in Section 3.A of the City Administrator Employment Agreement as
were intended when the City Administrator Agreement was entered into on June 1, 2008
(the "Conditional Clause") (emphasis added)" (Rec. 79, Exhibit B herein).
The language of the Supplemental Release far from releases "all claims against the City
of Sun Valley", as had been demanded by Attorney Naylor.

lA) The Employment Agreement Was Not Incorporated Into The Supplemental Release
In order for an "incorporation by reference" to occur, the parties must "clearly
communicate that the purpose of the reference is to incorporate the referenced material into" the
second document, Northrup Grumman v. U.S., 535 F.3d 1339, 1345 (U.S. Fed.App. 2008). Mere

113

Supp.Rec. 78-79.
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reference to a second document does not "automatically result in 'wholesale incorporation' " of
the referred to document into the first, Precision Pine & Timber v. U.S., 596 F.3d 817 (U.S.
Fed.App. 2010); Minshew v. Donley, 2012 WL 3231027, 911 F.Supp.2d 1043, 1059 (U.S. Nev.
2012). In Intesa Sanpaolo v. Credit Agricole Corp. And Investment Bank, 2013 WL 4856199, 3
(U.S. S.D.N.Y 2013), the U.S. Court for the Southern District Of New York described that:
"While express identification of a document is a necessary condition for incorporation of
that document, it is not a sufficient one. In addition to language explicitly identifying the
referenced document, there must also be language that 'clearly communicates that the
purpose of the reference is to incorporate the referenced material into the contract, rather
than merely to acknowledge that the referenced material is relevant to the contract, e.g. as
background'" (@3) (citing Northrup Grumman v. U.S. @ 1345).
As was stated in Precision Pine v. U.S., @ 826, "If the parties had intended to incorporate
[the ESA], they could have done so expressly, through an integration clause."
The Supplemental Release merely put the Briscoe Administration on notice that there
were certain claims that Ms. Hammer did not intend to release when she entered into the
Employment Agreement. That was made clear to Attorney Naylor leading up to the submission
of the Supplemental Release. The Supplemental Release includes no specific language
incorporating the Employment Agreement, or any part of it, into the Supplemental Release.

JB) The Briscoe Administration's Conduct At The Time Of The Submission Of The
Supplemental Release And Payment Of The "Severance" Shows That The Briscoe
Administration Acknowledged That Ms. Hammer Had Not Waived Any Non Wage Or Service
Related Claims, Including Claims Under The IPPEA.
Prior to the submission of the Supplemental Release to Briscoe Administration officials
on January 23, 2012, Attorney Naylor was sent numerous communications confirming that Ms.
Hammer was not going to release any non service or non wage types of claims in order to receive
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"severance" she was due under the Employment Agreement (see Exhibit C herein) 114 . Ms.
Hammer received several communications back from Attorney Naylor in response making clear
that under no circumstances would the Briscoe Administration pay Ms. Hammer the "severance"
unless Ms. Hammer provided the Briscoe Administration with a signed release which
specifically stated "I release all claims against the City of Sun Valley" (see Exhibit C herein) 115 .
Ms. Hammer, instead, submitted the non-compliant Supplemental Release which did not release
"all claims", and certainly not specifically any IPPEA claims - and the Briscoe Administration
paid her the "severance" anyway.
Also, on January 23, 2012, Former Treasurer Frostenson confirmed to Mr. Donoval that
the entire "severance" to be paid to Ms. Hammer only related to wage types of claims, not to any
liquidated damages or other types of compensation 116 . Former Treasurer Frostenson confirmed
that the Briscoe Administration would withhold employment taxes on the entire "severance",
which would not be required if the "severance" included non wage types of payment 117 .
The silence of Attorney Naylor and the conduct of Former Treasurer Frostenson, and the
payment of the "severance" by direct deposit without any further communications, justified Ms.
Hammer to believe that the Briscoe Administration had agreed that Ms. Hammer's "severance"
did not include settlement of any non wage claims, such as those under the IPPEA, as Ms.
Hammer had asserted, and that the issue was resolved in Ms. Hammer's favor.
Briscoe Administration officials were well aware that Ms. Hammer was reserving her
114

Rec. I 036, Supp.Rec. 53, Supp.Rec. 60-61.
Rec. 1488, Supp.Rec. 69, Supp.Rec. 71-72.
116 Donoval Recon. Aff., Para. 29-32, Supp.Rec. 36-37; Supp.Rec. 81.
117 Donoval Recon. Aff., Para. 29-32, Supp.Rec. 36-37; Supp.Rec. 81.
115
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rights to continue to bring certain claims even if she was paid the "severance", and were well
aware that Ms. Hammer had rejected the "all claims against the City of Sun Valley" language
Attorney Naylor had demanded - and paid her the "severance" anyway. Through three years of
extensive litigation, Briscoe Administration officials have, instead, perpetrated the fiction that
Ms. Hammer voluntarily waived claims under the IPPEA, or somehow fraudulently induced the
Briscoe Administration to pay the "severance", when she had done neither.
A waiver of Ms. Hammer's IPPEA claims should not be forced upon Ms. Hammer based
on trickery - which describes Attorney Naylor's and the Briscoe Administration's conduct.
Based on the circumstances related to the submission of the Supplemental Release, and the
conduct of Attorney Naylor, Treasurer Frostenson and the Briscoe Administration, Ms. Hammer
certainly did not knowingly and unequivocally release "all claims", including claims under the
IPPEA, when she submitted the Supplemental Release to Briscoe Administration officials, and
was then paid the "severance" by direct deposit. Summary judgment should be vacated.
JC) The Supplemental Release Is Not Ambiguous. Thus, There Is No Need To Look Outside
The Four Corners Of The Supplemental Release To Deny The Briscoe Administration's
Request For Summary Judgment.
The phrase "all claims" is not included anywhere in the Supplemental Release. Nor does
the language of the Supplemental Release specifically release any claims under the IPPEA. The
Briscoe Administration's fallacious argument has been, and will inevitably continue to be, that
Ms. Hammer was supposed to have submitted a release which released "all claims" based on the
language of the separate Employment Agreement, and even if she did not, she still somehow
waived "all claims", including claims under the IPPEA, anyway.
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This Court must look only at the four comers of the Supplemental Release to determine
whether Ms. Hammer released "all" claims (see Hecla Mining v. Star-Morning Mining, @782 the waiver must clearly appear on the document purporting to be a waiver itself). And in doing
so, the Court must recognize that there is a big difference between the "all claims against the
City of Sun Valley" language that had been demanded by Attorney Naylor and the Briscoe
Administration, and the "any claims ... as were intended when the City Administrator
Agreement was entered into" language the Briscoe Administration received in response.
The Supplemental Release is clear on its face, and is not ambiguous. By the language of
the Supplemental Release, Ms. Hammer retained the right to pursue "some" claims even if the
Briscoe Administration paid her the "severance" described in the Employment Agreement. All
language in a contract must have been intended to have been inserted for a purpose, Wright v.
Village Of Wilder, 63 Idaho 122, 117 P.2d 1002, 1002 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1941) - Contract must be so
construed as to give force and effect to every part thereof) (see also Ace Realty, Inc. v. Anderson,
106 Idaho 742, 749-750, 682 P.2d 1289 (Id. App.Ct. 1984). What else could the language of the
Conditional Clause mean - other than that Ms. Hammer was retaining "some" claims, including
those claims she did not intend she would be required to release when she signed the
Employment Agreement, such as statutory claims. Otherwise, logic dictates that she would have
used the phrase "all claims" in the Supplemental Release, as Attorney Naylor was adamantly
demanding, or simply sign the Naylor Drafted Release.
The Court need not look to the Employment Agreement to find out what claims Ms.
Hammer intended to prospectively release when she signed the Employment Agreement in 2008
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it simply needs to ask Ms. Hammer what those claims are. Wage claims?

claims?

Yes. Vacation pay

Yes. Overtime pay claims? - Yes. Tort claims? - No. Workmen's compensation

claims? - No. IPPEA claims? - NO! If the Briscoe Administration didn't like that Ms. Hammer
held unilateral discretion related to claims she retained if paid the "severance", it should have
asked for another version of a release before paying the "severance". Having failed to do so - the
Briscoe Administration cannot complain it was fraudulently induced into paying the "severance"
or somehow damaged.
The Supplemental Release is not ambiguous. It reserves Ms. Hammer's right to decide
the particular claims, including IPPEA claims, which were not intended to be released if Ms.
Hammer was ever terminated. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Sun Valley was in error.

JD) Based On The Specific Language Of The Supplemental Release, And Ms. Hammer's
Affidavit That She Did Not Intend To Waive Any Potential Future Claims Under The IPPEA
When She Signed The Employment Agreement In June Of 2008, Summary Judgment Should
Have Been Entered In Ms. Hammer's Favor As To The Waiver Issue.
Ms. Hammer submitted Affidavits confirming that she did not intend to prospectively
waive claims under the IPPEA that might arise during her employment or as part of her
termination when she entered into the Employment Agreement with Sun Valley in June of
2008 118 . Former Mayor Willich' s Affidavits confirm the same from his perspective as the
authorized representative of Sun Valley at the time 119 •
There is no genuine issue of material fact that Ms. Hammer did not intend to
prospectively waive any claims under the IPPEA when she signed the Employment Agreement
118

Hammer SJ Aff., Para. 7-11, Rec. 1017-1018; Hammer Recon. Aff., Para. 8-12, Supp.Rec. 85-87.
Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 4, Rec. 663; Willich SJ Aff., Para. 6-9, Rec. 1043; Willich Recon. Aff., Para. 5-11,
Supp.Rec. 114-116.
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in June of 2008, and that the Supplemental Release specifically reserved Ms. Hammer's right to
proceed on any claims that she did not intend to waive when she signed the Employment
Agreement. Therefore, Ms. Hammer requests that the Court enter summary judgment in Ms.
Hammer's favor, that as a matter of law, Ms. Hammer did not waive her right to bring claims
under the IPPEA due to the submission of the Supplemental Release to the Briscoe
Administration and having received the "severance", and remand the matter back to the District
Court without any further proceedings related to the "waiver" issue.
JE) The "Severance" Paid To Ms. Hammer Has Been Defined By The U.S. Supreme Court,
And This Court, As Only Being Related To Past Services Rendered Or Performed, Not To
Statutory Claims Or Liquidated Damages. Thus, As A Matter Of Law, Payment Of The
"Severance" Described In The Employment Agreement Did Not Include Settlement Of Non
Salary Related Claims, Including IPPEA Claims.

In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court defined "severance" to be "wages" for "services"
rendered to an employer. The issue in the 2014 case of U.S. v. Quality Stores, 134 S.Ct. 1395
(U.S. Sup.Ct. 2014) was whether an employer was required to withhold employment and FICA
taxes on "severance" payments made to employees when the company closed. In discussing what
"severance" payments are, the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Quality Stores, 1399-1400 stated:
"Severance payments made to terminated employees are 'remuneration for employment'.
Severance payments are, of course, 'remuneration', and common sense dictates that
employees receive the payments 'for employment' ... Severance payments are made in
consideration for employment - for a 'service ... performed' by 'an employee for the
person employing him.' "
Even before the U.S. Supreme Court's 2014 ruling related to what "severance" means,
this Court, in Parker v. Underwriters Laboratories, 140 Idaho 517, 96 P.3d 618 (Idaho Sup.Ct.
2004 ), similarly discussed what "severance" was by stating:
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" 'Severance pay' has been defined as 'a sum of money usually based on length of
employment for which an employee is eligible upon termination.' (citing to the .4merican
Heritage Dictionary Of the English Language, 4th Edition, 2000). The purpose of a
severance plan is to protect employees from economic hardship and to reward them for
past services rendered (emphasis added)." (citing to 27 Am.Jur.2d, Employment
Relationships, Sec. 70) (@ 520)
The Parker v. Underwriters Court then cited to a Colorado case of Moore v. Digital
Equipment, 868 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Colo. App.Ct. 1994) by stating that "A severance allowance is

a payment made to an employee in return/or services previously provided (emphasis added)."
The Supplemental Release gives no definition of what Ms. Hammer was about to receive
other than as "severance". And, the phrase "severance" is found at least five (5) times in the
Employment Agreement. Neither the phrase "liquidated damages", nor any other definition of
what the funds Ms. Hammer would receive if she was terminated "without cause", other than
"severance", is described anywhere else in either document. As the U.S. Supreme Court and this
Court have defined "severance" as wages for past services rendered or performed, as a matter of
law, it was error for the District Court to find that any "severance" paid to Ms. Hammer by the
Briscoe Administration was either in the form of payment for settlement of statutory claims
(such as under the IPPEA) or "liquidated damages" as was described in the Summary Judgment
Order. Ms. Hammer prays that this Court enter a finding that "severance", as defined in the
Employment Agreement and the Supplemental Release, and as actually paid, meant payment for
services previously performed by Ms. Hammer up to the time of her termination, and for nothing
more, including as liquidated damages or settlement of other claims, including IPPEA claims.
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JF) The Court Must Interpret The Employment Agreement Based On The Intent Of The
Parties When The Employment Agreement Was Entered Into, .4nd Not Retroactively ,4llow
The Briscoe Administration To Redefine The Terms Of The Employment Agreement.

Ms. Hammer and Former Mayor Willich have sworn that in reviewing the Employment
Agreement drafted by Former City Attorney Peebles in 2008, they both accepted the common
definition of "severance" as relating only to remuneration for past services rendered, and that
neither considered that by entering into the Employment Agreement that should Ms. Hammer
ever be terminated "without cause" she would be waiving any non-wage related claims 120 .
In interpreting a contract, the Court must look to the intent of the parties "at the time the
contract was made", Opportunity, LLC v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 38 P.3d 1258 (Idaho
Sup.Ct. 2002). Thus, the Court must look to the intent of Ms. Hammer and Former Mayor
Willich when the Employment Agreement was signed, not the retroactive interpretation of the
Briscoe Administration which did not participate in the negotiations of the Employment
Agreement, and enter summary judgment in Ms. Hammer's favor.
JG) Both Ms. Hammer And Former Mayor Willich Have Confirmed That The Employment
Agreement Should Have Excluded The Waiver O(Non Service Or Wage Related Claims, Such
As Statutory Claims, I(Ms. Hammer Was Terminated "Without Cause". Therefore, The Court
Should Reform The Contract To Confirm Such.
When both parties to a contract have made a mistake (i.e. a mutual mistake), which is
substantial or fundamental as to defeat the objectives of the parties, Primary Health Network v.

Idaho Dept. Of Admin., 137 Idaho 663, 668, 52 P.3d 307 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2002), equity requires the
contract to be reformed to reflect the intent of the parties at the time the contract was entered
120

Hammer SJ Aff., Para. 7-11, Rec. 1017-1018; Hammer Recon. Aff., Para. 8-12, Supp.Rec. 85-87. Willich IHRC
Aff., Para. 4, Rec. 663; Willich SJ Aff., Para. 6-9, Rec. 1043; Willich Recon. Aff., Para. 5-11, Supp.Rec. 114-116.
Donoval Recon Aff., Para. 6-9, Rec. 31-32.
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Collins v. Parkinson, 96 Idaho 294, 296, 527 P.2d 1252 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1974). In that situation,

the Court is not making a new contract, but rather "enforcing the agreement the parties would
have made but for the mistake", Collins v. Parkinson @296, citing Exum v. Portnell:f- Marsh
Valley Irr. Co., 38 Idaho 155, 200 P. 112 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1923). To determine what the correct

provisions of the contract should have been, the Court is allowed to use parol evidence, Exum v.
Portnell:f-Marsh; Bilbao v. Krettinger, 91 Idaho 69, 73,415 P.2d 712 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1966)). The

Court then reforms the instrument "to reflect the intention of the parties, i.e. the agreement the
parties would have made but for the mistake", Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 640, 671 P.2d
1099 (Id. App.Ct. 1983) citing Exum v. Portneuf-Marsh.
The uncontroverted statements of both Ms. Hammer and Former Mayor Willich, are that
when the Employment Agreement was entered into in June of 2008, neither intended that Ms.
Hammer was required to waive any statutory claims, such as IPPEA claims, if she was ever
terminated "without cause" and paid the "severance" described in the Employment Agreement.
The evidence of Ms. Hammer's and Former Mayor Willich' s intent is "clear and satisfactory"
(see Collins v. Parkinson @ 296). Ms. Hammer 121 and Former Mayor Willich 122 have confirmed
that if there was any doubt about their understanding of what was to be released if Ms. Hammer
was ever terminated by Sun Valley in order for Ms. Hammer to obtain the "severance", they
would have added specific language to the Employment Agreement confirming their mutual
understanding on the issue. Therefore, the Court should reform the Employment Agreement to

121

Hammer Aff., Para. 3-11, Rec. 1016-1020; Hammer Recon. Aff., Para. 6-12, Supp.Rec. 84-92.
Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 4, Rec. 661-672; Willich Aff., Para. 3-9, Rec. 1042-1044; and Willich Recon. Aff.,
Para. 4-11, Supp.Rec. 113-117.
122
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specifically include that Ms. Hammer was not (is not) required to waive any statutory or non
service or wage related claims, including specifically claims under the IPPEA, due to the
payment of the "severance" described in the Employment Agreement.

lH) The Assertion That Ms. Hammer Prospectively Waived Any Statutory Claims, Such As
Those Under The IPPEA, When She Entered Into The Employment Agreement In June of
2008, Violates Public Policy Prohibiting The Prospective Waiver O(Statutory Claims.
In 1974, in the seminal case of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 50, 94 S.Ct.
1011 (U.S. Sup.Ct. 1974), in describing whether an employee could prospectively waive rights
under Title VII, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that, although procedural rights could be
prospectively waived (such as whether an employee must seek recourse under Title VII through
arbitration), the prospective waiver of an employee's substantive rights under Title VII through

contract or settlement agreement was violative of public policy, and thus "not susceptible of
prospective waiver". Even when an employee has agreed to waive past conduct of the employer
(as the Briscoe Administration has claimed Ms. Hammer did by signing the Supplemental
Release) the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that waiver of statutorily protected rights in a
settlement agreement must be "clear and unmistakable" and "explicitly stated", Wright v.

Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80, 119 S.Ct. 391 (U.S. Sup.Ct. 1998) 123 .
As to what this Court has done related to Idaho statutes, in Lee v. Sun Valley, 107 Idaho
976, 979, 695 P.2d 361 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 1984) (although not discussing employment agreements),
this Court stated that agreements between parties cannot absolve a party from liability for

123

Nowhere in the Employment Agreement or the Supplemental Release is there any specific mention of the iPPEA.
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violations of the public policy imposed by statutes." 124
The Court is requested to review three federal cases which follow the same fact pattern
and cover the same prospective waiver issues in employment contracts at issue here, for
guidance (namely, Adams v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580 (U.S. App.6th 1995); Rieghard v.

Limbach Co., 158 F.Supp.2d 730 (U.S. E.D.Virg. 2001); and, Richardson v. Sugg, 448 F.3d 1046
(U.S. App.8 1h 2006)). In all three cases federal courts struck down attempts by employers to
enforce prospective waiver provisions in employee contracts.
In Adams v. Philip Morris, the U.S. 6th Circuit Appellate Court stated that "Where a
release waives rights unknown to the releaser at the time of signing of the waiver, or, as in this
case, the claimant waives rights protecting against conduct that has not yet occurred, the release
must be particularly scrutinized as to the intent of the parties." (@ 584) The Adams v. Phillip

Morris Court went on to state:
"The scope of the release, like any contract, depends on ascertaining the intent of the
parties at the time of signing the release. The dispositive inquiry is "what did the parties
intend?" Intent is determined by reviewing the language of the entire instrument and all
surrounding facts and circumstances under which the parties acted in light of the
applicable law as to employment discrimination at the time. It is necessary to examine all
the circumstances surrounding the formation of the release." (@ 585)
In Rieghard v. Limbach Co., the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
found that prospective waivers in employment contracts if allowed, would have the "pernicious
effect of tending to encourage violations by assuring the wrongdoers that they may act with
impunity." (@732-733) The Rieghard v. Limbach Co. Court concluded that "Where, as here, a

124

In Lee v. Sun Valley. the statute at issue was Idaho Statute 6-1204 related to the standard of care fur outfitters.
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covenant not to sue purports to waive prospectively any future rights or claims under ERISA, the
result, in effect, is to grant the employer a license to violate ERISA in the future with impunity.
ERISA rights are too important to permit this result." (@733)
Finally, this Court should pay particular attention to the Richardson v. Sugg case, in
which former University of Arkansas' basketball coach Nolan Richardson's ("Coach
Richardson") contract had almost the exact same language as Ms. Hammer's Employment
Agreement, and Coach Richardson was paid a $500,000 severance payment when he was
terminated. The U.S.

3th

Circuit Appellate Court ruled that Coach Richardson had not

prospectively waived his Title VII civil rights claims when he signed his contract,
notwithstanding the waiver language in the contract, and that he had already been paid the
$500,000 severance payment. The Richardson v. Sugg Court confirmed that "the public policy
concerns that inhere in allowing prospective waivers of Title VII rights support the conclusion
that such waiver is invalid" (@ 1054), and went on to state:
"First ... allowing an employee to bargain away the right to pursue a prospective
discrimination claim frustrates this statutory scheme. Second, allowing employers to ink
a deal with an employee to waive prospective claims strikes at the heart of Congress' aim
to deter discriminatory conduct by employers." (@1054-1055)
The Richardson v. Suggs Court cited the language of Adams v. Philip Morris that:
"An employer cannot purchase a license to discriminate. An employer cannot purchase a
license to avoid its duty to eliminate practices which perpetuate prior discriminatory acts
any more than it can circumvent its responsibility for future acts of purposeful
discrimination." (@585)
This Court should refuse to allow the Briscoe Administration to assert that provisions of
the Employment Agreement, which purport to prospectively waive Ms. Hammer's statutory
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IPPEA claims are void as against public policy. Nor should this Court allow the Briscoe
Administration's claims that the Supplemental Release waived unspecified IPPEA claims.
ll) As The Employment Agreement Only Refers To Payments Made To Ms. Hammer Upon
Termination As Being "Severance", The Briscoe Administration Was Required To Provide
Ms. Hammer With Additional Consideration For The Waiver O(Any Non Wage Or Service
Related Claims, Such As Any Claims Under The IPPEA.
For an employee to waive statutory rights, the employer must provide additional
consideration for such waiver, above and beyond what the employee is already entitled to,
E.E.O.C. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 778 F.3d 444,449 (U.S. App.3rd 2015). The Employment

Agreement and the Supplemental Release both describe that the funds that Ms. Hammer was
receiving was considered "severance". Nowhere else in the Employment Agreement or the
Supplemental Release is there a description that "severance" includes payment for other claims
such as liquidated damages or other "enhanced benefits" (as in Parker v. Underwriter's) by
which Ms. Hammer was releasing any rights she may have also had under the IPPEA. Therefore,
as no additional consideration was provided to Ms. Hammer specifically related to a release of
any IPPEA claims, the payment of "severance" did not release Ms. Hammer's IPPEA claims.
ISSUE II) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by failing to recognize that Ms.
Hammer had a cause of action under the IPPEA for adverse actions taken by Briscoe
Administration officials after Ms. Hammer's termination and after Ms. Hammer supplied
the Supplemental Release to Briscoe Administration officials on January 23, 2012?
Even if Ms. Hammer waived any claims which occurred prior to her termination,
pursuant to the IPPEA, she is entitled to pursue claims against Sun Valley for its adverse actions
after her termination, including subjecting her to continued investigations (both within Sun
Valley and by outside agencies) and by issuing defamatory reports and statements. Idaho Statute
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broadly states that an "Adverse action" means to "discharge, threaten or otherwise

discriminate against an employee in any manner". However, Idaho Statute 6-2103 does not limit
when the adverse action must occur or that it only applies to current employees. Federal cases

have extended claims for "adverse actions" to post-termination conduct, Pardi v. Kaiser
Foundation, 389 F.3d 840, 850 (U.S. App.9 1h 2004) and threats of criminal charges, Dahlia v.
Rodriguez, 735 F,3d 1060, 1079 (U.S. App.9th 2013), including that the U.S. Court for Idaho

stated that a "campaign of harassment and humiliation could be deemed an adverse action",
Ledford v. Idaho Dept. Of Juvenile Corr., 2014 WL 884546, 4 (U.S. Idaho 2014).

Since Ms. Hammer did not include prospective adverse actions of Sun Valley in the
Supplemental Release, even if this Court finds that Ms. Hammer waived pre-termination claims,
Ms. Hammer should be allowed to proceed on her claims that adverse actions the Briscoe
Administration took after her termination, are actionable under the IPPEA.
ISSUE III) Did the District Court err as a matter of law in entering summary judgment
against Ms. Hammer by finding that judicial estoppel barred Ms. Hammer from raising
any claims against Sun Valley under the provisions of the IPPEA?
As part of the Summary Judgment Order (Rec. 1507-1517), the District Court found that
Ms. Hammer was judicially estopped from bringing her IPPEA claims because she asserted that
the Briscoe Administration had purportedly terminated her "without cause", but that in reality
Ms. Hammer was terminated either a) because of allegations of misconduct that had been raised
against her as part of the Ball Investigation, b) in retaliation for her complaints of harassment
against Defendant Ribi, or, c) for filing the Original IPPEA Law Suit and a Complaint with the
IHRC. The District Court raised the issue of judicial estoppel sua sponte at the oral arguments on
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summary judgment (Transcript 12/16/14), and then included it in the Summary Judgment Order.
Even though Ms. Hammer raised the issue in her extensive reconsideration request (Supp.Rec.
30-173; Supp.Rec. 186-219), the District Court failed to discuss it in its one sentence denial of
the reconsideration request (Supp.Rec. 220).
Ms. Hammer's description of pre-textual employment termination has been discussed in
numerous Idaho cases, both in relation to IPPEA claims (Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire, 148
Idaho 391, 395-397, 224 P.3d 458 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2008); Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147
Idaho 552, 559-560, 212 P.3d 982 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2009)), and as the basis for various constitutional
claims of terminated employees (Harkness v. City Of Burley, 110 Idaho 353, 715 P.2d 1283 (Id.
Sup.Ct. 1986); Hatheway v. Univ. Ofldaho, 155 Idaho 255,310 P.3d 315 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2013)).
Ms. Hammer should not be penalized for pleading elements required for a pretext
employment termination claim, both under the IPPEA and in regards to other constitutional
claims. Ms. Hammer prays that this Court reverse the District Court's judicial estoppel findings,
ISSUE IV) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by finding that personal liability
does not attach to Defendant Ribi or Defendant Briscoe under the IPPEA?

On November 26, 2013, the District Court entered its Order dismissing Defendant Ribi
and Defendant Briscoe (Rec. 567-575), finding that individual liability does not attach to
municipal elected officials under the IPPEA. On February 18, 2014, the District Court denied
Ms. Hammer's reconsideration request (Rec. 793-795). This Court interprets statutes de novo on
appeal, State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 865-866 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2011).
The entire IPPEA is made up of nine (9) sections (see Exhibit D herein). The purpose of
the IPPEA is to prohibit retaiiation (i.e. adverse actions) against employees that report
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government waste or misconduct.
Idaho Statute 6-2103(5 )(c) is interesting in that it defines a municipal type of '·Public

body" to include the individual "member or employee" of the entity (as it does for other various
government types of units). But, the phrase "Public body" is not thereafter used anywhere in the
IPPEA. It seems the Idaho Legislature intended to use the phrase "Public body" for some
purpose. Ms. Hammer asserts that the Idaho Legislature intended to include the phrase "Public
body" and all entities and individuals described as part of a "Public body", under the definition
of "Employer" in Idaho Statute 6-2103(4)(a), to ensure these individuals and other types of
government units would be subject to liability for violating the adverse action prohibitions of the
IPPEA. The Court should note that during debate on the IPPEA, Rep. Berain, the sponsor of the
IPPEA bill, made clear that the "heads of those agencies" would be subject to the IPPEA (Rec.
233), indicating that there would be personal liability for any high ranking government official
who retaliates against a government employee.
But most significant is that, under Idaho Statute 6-2105(3), the employee must bring suit
under the IPPEA "where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides (emphasis
added)", making clear that "persons", not just entities, would be sued under the IPPEA.
As the Supplemental Release only named Sun Valley as a releasee, not any of its
individual officials, the Supplemental Release cannot possibly have released either Defendant
Briscoe or Defendant Ribi, individually, from claims under the IPPEA.
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ISSUE V) Did the District Court err as a matter of law that Sun Valley, Investigator Ball
and Attorney Naylor possessed attorney-client and work product privileges related to the
Bail Investigation, and the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report, which was released to the
public?

On January 17, 2014, the District Court entered its Order (Supp.Rec. 15-25) denying Ms.
Hammer's Motion To Compel production of documents related to the Ball Investigation based
on both work product and attorney client privileges, and on May 16, 2014 the District Court
entered its Order (Rec. 809-818) denying reconsideration of those findings. The burden of
showing that information is privileged, and exempt from discovery, is on the party asserting the
privilege, Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 704, 116 P.3d 27 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2005). This
Court reviews the granting of both attorney-client and work product privileges de novo, U.S. v.
Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 563-564 (U.S. App.9th 2011).

Work Product Privilege Issues

The work product privilege is based on I.R. C.P. 26(b )(3 ), which protects documents
prepared "in anticipation of litigation or for trial".
SA) Ball Investigation Communications Are Not Covered By Work Product Protections
Because The Ball Investigation Was Not Commenced Primarily In Anticipation O(Litigation.
In analyzing whether there is work product protections of an employee investigation, the

test is whether, in light of the factual setting of the particular case, the investigator was retained
because of the prospect of litigation, Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 (U.S.
App.8 1h 1978). In National Farmers v. City And County Of Denver, 718 P.2d 1044, 1047-1049
(Col. Sup.Ct. 1986), in regards to an employee investigation, the Colorado Supreme Court
described that the test is whether the "dominant purpose" of the employee investigation relates to
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specific litigation. Work product protections are not granted to communications related to an
investigation "If the same or essentially similar documents would have been created whether or
not litigation was foreseen", Banks v. Office Of Senate, 236 F.R.D. 16, 19 (U.S. D.C. 2006).
The Court should be clear as to the Ball Investigation chronology of events. First, Ms.
Hammer was accused of misconduct. Second, the Ball Investigation was commenced. Third, Ms.
Hammer was placed on administrative leave. Fourth, in response to the commencement of the
Ball Investigation, and Ms. Hammer being placed on administrative leave, Ms. Hammer filed the
Original IPPEA Law Suit. Fifth, and finally, Attorney Naylor was appointed by ICRMP to
defend against the claims in the Original IPPEA Law Suit. It was the instigation of the Ball
Investigation and that Ms. Hammer was placed on administrative leave which caused Ms.
Hammer to take legal action - not the other way around.
Former Mayor Willich's sworn-to testimony is that Investigator Ball was not retained to
perform any work related to litigation, but solely to perform a "fact finding", "independent
internal disciplinary investigation" to assist Former Mayor Willich in making a "decision
whether to discipline" Ms. Hammer or not 125. The Sun Valley City Council simply authorized
Former Mayor Willich to engage an investigator to conduct an "independent investigation" 126 .
Nowhere in those directions is there any indication that the "independent investigation" was
commenced related to threatened litigation. And, Investigator Ball's retainer agreement (Rec.

125 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff.. Para. 9-13, Rec. 675-677; Willich Supp. Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para., 16, Rec. 540;
Willich Compel Aff., Para. 17-23, 95, Rec. 298-299, 316; Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 12, 14, Rec. 772-773.
126 See Rec. 733. Former Mayor Willich is adamant that he was directed to hire an "investigator", not a lawyer, to
perform the Ball Investigation (see Willich Dep., Rec. 1180-1185, Rec. 1203). Former Mayor Willich asserts that "I
didn't hire an attorney I hired an independent investigator" (Willich Dep., Pg. 132, Line 3-4, Rec. l 203).
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323-324) only describes that she was being retained to perform a "fact-finding investigation on
behalf of Sun Valley", without any mention of litigation.
In depositions, Sun Valley officials directly contradicted the Briscoe Administration's
assertions to the District Court that Investigator Ball was retained because of threatened
litigation. Former Mayor Willich confirmed that Investigator Ball was not hired because of
litigation, but was hired to perform an "independent investigation" 127 . Former Council Member
Lamb 128 and former Sun Valley City Council Member Robert Youngman 129 ("Former Council
Member Youngman") confirmed that Investigator Ball was not hired because of threatened
litigation, but to perform a disciplinary investigation. Even Defendant Briscoe 130 and Defendant
Ribi 131 admitted that the Ball Investigation was not commenced because of threatened litigation.
Attorney Naylor was not retained because of the commencement of the Ball Investigation
- he was appointed by ICRMP solely because of the subsequent filing of the Original IPPEA
Law Suit. Any discussion related to the Ball Investigation would have related solely to the
misconduct allegations against Ms. Hammer. Therefore, such communications are not work
product privileged, Koumoulis v. Independent Marketing Group, 29 F.Supp.3d 142,149 (U.S.
E.D.N.Y 2014).
The Ball Investigation was an internal disciplinary investigation commenced in the
normal operation of Sun Valley's business, and would have been completed regardless of

Willich Dep., Rec. 1180-1185, 1203, 1208.
Lamb Dep., Rec. 1363, 1366.
129 YoungmanDep.,Rec. 1325, 1336.
130 Briscoe Dep .. Pg. 68, Line 21 Pg. 69, Line 4, Rec. 1235.
131 Ribi Dep .• Pg. 86-88. Ribi Dep. Pg. 88, Line 2-6, Rec. 1288.
127

128
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whether Ms. Hammer thereafter filed suit. The primary or dominant purpose of the Ball
Investigation was not to respond to litigation, but solely to determine whether Ms. Hammer
committed some sort of misconduct for which she could be disciplined. Nothing about the Ball
Investigation is entitled to work product protection. The District Court's findings granting a
global work product protection to all Ball Investigation communications was in error.

Attorney-Client Privilege Issues
The attorney-client privilege is based on I.R.E. 502(b) which states that communications
which are made to or from an attorney "made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of
professional legal services to the client" are protected from disclosure. The attorney-client
privilege only protects communications specifically related to "securing a legal opinion", In Re:
Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1355 (U.S. App.4th 1984).

Whether An Attorney-Client Relationship Exists
Before an attorney-client privilege is established, the attorney and the putative client
actually must have entered into a valid attorney-client relationship. This Court has developed a
two prong test for determining whether a valid attorney-client relationship exists. One prong
includes looking at whether the client "subjectively" believed he/she had entered into an
attorney-client relationship, Warner v. Stewart, 129 Idaho 588, 593, 930 P.2d 1030 (Id. Sup.Ct.
1997) and Berry v. McFarland, 153 Idaho 5, 9, 278 P.3d 407 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2012). The other prong
is whether both the client and the attorney had agreed by "clear consent" that they had entered
into an attorney-client relationship (Warner v. Stewart@ 593; Berry v. McFarland@ 9).
Normally, it is the attorney attempting to convince the Court that no attorney-client relationship
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exists to avoid a malpractice claim (see Berry v. McFarland) or an ethics complaint (see Warner

v. Stewart). However, in this case, it is the putative client (i.e. Former Mayor Willich) asserting
that no attorney-client relationship existed during the Post Election Period, especially in regards
to the Ball Investigation, to negate the Briscoe Administration's retroactive assertion that
Attorney Naylor held some form of attorney-client relationship with the Willich Administration.
In Muncey v. Children's Home, 84 Idaho 147,153,369 P.2d 586 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1962), in
regards to attorney authority, this Court stated: "When a question of his authority is raised, as in
this instant case, his actual authority must be established."
SB) Attorney Naylor Was Reiected As Sun Valley's Appointed Counsel Because Of Conflicts
Of Interest Between, a) Sun Valley And ICRMP, And, b) Sun Valley And Defendant Ribi.
Attorney Naylor Was Thereafter Required To Withdraw From Any Representation Of Sun
Valley.

Former Mayor Willich held initial discussions with Attorney Naylor, but fairly quickly
recognized that Attorney Naylor had a conflict of interest in representing both Sun Valley and
Defendant Ribi in the Original IPPEA Law Suit 13 2 . Former Mayor Willich demanded that
ICMRP assign Sun Valley another attorney, but was told by ICRMP personnel and Attorney
Naylor that he had no choice in the matter 133 .
As to the conflict between Sun Valley and ICRMP, Former Mayor Willich readily
admitted to Attorney Naylor that Defendant Ribi had harassed Ms. Hammer 134 and that
Defendant Ribi was retaliating against Ms. Hammer by making misconduct allegations,

Willich Compel Aff., Para. 61, 67, 73.78, Rec. 310-312; Willich Dep., Rec. 1181.
Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 19-20. Rec. 678-679; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 36-37, Rec. 302-303; Willich
Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 13, Rec. 773.
134 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 77, Rec. 31 l.
132

133
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including criminal misconduct allegations, against her 135 . Those admissions by Former Mayor
Willich on behalf of Sun Valley and the Willich Administration were in direct conflict with
ICRMP's potential liability for substantial damages for Defendant Ribi's harassment and
retaliatory conduct towards Ms. Hammer. When there is a conflict between an insured and an
insurer, the insured is entitled to reject the insurer's appointed counsel and obtain independent
counsel, San Diego Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc., 162 Cal.App.3d 358 (Cal. Sup.Ct.
1988). Attorney Naylor had the duty to recognize the conflict between Sun Valley and ICRMP as
to liability and damages in the Original IPPEA Law Suit, and had an obligation to withdraw from
any further claims of representation of Sun Valley. Instead, Attorney Naylor took the position
that he had an inherent right to act in any way he chose as ICRMP's appointed counsel.
As to Defendant Ribi, as he was a member of the Sun Valley City Council, Former
Mayor Willich recognized Attorney Naylor's right to defend Council Member Ribi against the
Original IPPEA Law Suit, and his need to cooperate with Attorney Naylor. However, Former
Mayor Willich also recognized the conflict between Sun Valley's defenses in the Original
IPPEA Law Suit verses Defendant Ribi's personal defenses. The Willich Administration had the
right to claim that Defendant Ribi individually, and not Sun Valley the entity, was responsible
for the harassment and retaliation against Ms. Hammer, and had the right to demand that separate
legal counsel be appointed to represent the divergent interests of Sun Valley as opposed to its codefendant Defendant Ribi, Murphy v. Urso, 88 Ill.2d 444 (Ill. Sup.Ct. 1981).
The Court should recognize the conflict between Attorney Naylor's representation of
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Willich Compel Aff., Para. 70, Rec. 309-3 iO.
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ICRMP's interests and Defendant Ribi's interests, verses Sun Valley's divergent interests.
Former Mayor Willich had the right to demand separate counsel under those circumstances. The
conflict also would prevent any potential claims of "common interest" privilege, because, as to
the harassment claims of Ms. Hammer, Sun Valley and Defendant Ribi were not aligned.
Attorney Naylor's failure to acknowledge his duty to withdraw as counsel to the Willich
Administration vitiates any attorney-client client claims he may have otherwise asserted.
Former Mayor Willich has confirmed, under oath, that he "subjectively" never
considered Attorney Naylor to be his, or Sun Valley's, attorney during the Willich
Administration (see Warner v. Stewart). And, both Attorney Naylor and Former Mayor Willich
do not agree that any attorney-client relationship formed (see Berry v. McFarland). Thus,
Attorney Naylor cannot be considered to have been Former Mayor Willich's or the Willich
Administration's attorney for the purpose of any attorney-client protections during the Post
Election Period, at all. Attorney Naylor has failed to bear his burden pursuant to Muncey v.
Children's Home to prove his actual authority related to the Willich Administration.

SC) Attorney Naylor Was Not Provided With Any Authority Related To The Ball Investigation,
And Thus Cannot Claim Any Attorney-Client Privileges Related To The Ball Investigation.
Even if this Court finds that Attorney Naylor had the right to force himself upon the
Willich Administration as its attorney in the Original IPPEA Law Suit, Attorney Naylor had no
right to assert a global, all-encompassing right to act as Sun Valley's legal counsel on all issues,
and in particular in regards to the Ball Investigation. I.R.E. 502(a)(5) only provides attorneyclient protections to communications "made in the furtherance of the rendition of professional
iegai services." Former Mayor Willich advised Attorney Naylor he was not to have anything to
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do with the Ball Investigation, other than that he could read the report prepared by Investigator
Ball when it was complete 136 . As Former Mayor Willich stated in his deposition: "Patti Ball was
supposed to be doing my investigation, not Kirt Naylor's investigation. Because, remember, he's
on the other team. Why would I want to get my independent investigation contaminated by this
outside influence? Didn't want it." 137 Former Mayor Willich re-affirmed this to Attorney Naylor
at their December 16, 2011 meeting 138 . The Sun Valley City Council also provided no authority
to Attorney Naylor to provide any direction to Investigator Ball or to be involved in the Ball
lnvestigation 139 . Therefore, because any communications between Attorney Naylor and
Investigator Ball or Sun Valley personnel were not done pursuant to any professional services
Attorney Naylor was authorized to perform related to the Ball Investigation, the District Court's
findings that Attorney Naylor possessed any attorney-client privileges related to the Ball
Investigation should be vacated. All communications related to the Ball Investigation, including
those to or from Attorney Naylor, should be required to be produced.
SD) Attorney Nay/or's Conduct Shows He Never Acted In A Manner Which Resulted In A
Valid Attorney-Client Relationship With The Willich Administration.
Pursuant to Idaho Statute 50-602:
"The mayor ... shall be the chief administrative official of the city ... have the
superintending control of all the officers and affairs of the city (emphasis added)."
No Idaho statute provides the Sun Valley City Council or individual members of the Sun

Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 15, Rec. 677-678; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 26-27, 72, Rec. 299-300, 310;
Willich Supp. Compel AfL Para. 13, Rec. 772-773; Willich Dep .. Rec. 1183.
137 Willich Deposition, Pg. 51, Line 2 to Pg. 7; Rec. 1183.
138 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 61-81, Rec. 307-313.
139 Youngman Dep., Rec. 1328.
136
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Valley City Council with any authority to direct any activities of Sun Valley or its employees or
agents, including Attorney Naylor, absent the formal passing of a resolution or ordinance. And
certainly no Idaho statute provides an insurance company appointed defense counsel with any
unilateral authority to make any decisions on behalf of Sun Valley or conduct any affairs of Sun
Valley absent explicit instructions from the Mayor of Sun Valley. Even if Attorney Naylor found
Former Mayor Willich' s direction to not be in the best interest of his other clients Defendant Ribi
and ICRMP, Attorney Naylor was still obligated, by Idaho statute, to report to and follow the
directions of Former Mayor Willich during the Post Election Period. The Record On Appeal is
replete with Attorney Naylor's failure to do so.
The Court cannot minimize Attorney Naylor's failure to obtain a written retainer
agreement during the Post Election Period defining his duties. Former Mayor Willich asserts that
failure was done fraudulently so that Attorney Naylor could later assert that he had greater
. now c1a1mmg
. . 141 . Because of 1·1m1ts
. p1aced upon
. than h e was ever prov1'd ed 140 , as h e 1s
auth onty
Attorney Naylor by Former Mayor Willich due to the conflict between the Willich
Administration's and Defendant Ribi's/ICRMP's strategy and scope of work, Attorney Naylor
simply refused to put into writing what that limited scope of authority (if any) really was. Only
later, with a new administration, did Attorney Naylor broaden his claim as to his authority.
In addition, in violation of I.R.P. C. 1. 7(b )(4 ), Attorney Naylor failed to obtain the written
consent of both Sun Valley and Defendant Ribi to simultaneously represent both in the Original

Willich Compel Affidavit, Para. 62; Rec. 308.
Although Attorney Naylor did obtain a written retainer agreement with Briscoe Administration shortly after
Defendant Briscoe was sworn in as the Nlayor of Sun Valley. (Rec. 452-455)
140
141
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IPPEA Law Suit.
Finally, Attorney Naylor's refusal to communicate with Former Mayor Willich related to
the Original IPPEA Law Suit during the Post Election Period, violating I.R.P. C. 1.4 in the
process, is the best indicator that Attorney Naylor himself believed he had no obligation to
Former Mayor Willich or the Willich Administration, as opposed to ICRMP and Defendant Ribi.
Attorney Naylor's conduct in contradicting almost all directions from Former Mayor Willich
during the Post Election Period, negates any claims that he and Former Mayor Willich entered
into a valid attorney-client relationship during the remainder of Willich Administration.
Former Mayor Willich, who readily admits that 'Tm an engineer, not an attorney",
needed the guidance of separate legal counsel he could trust and rely on 142

one who recognized

the inherent conflicts between the directives of the still legally authorized Willich Administration
verse the not yet legally authorized wishes of "Mayor-Elect" Defendant Briscoe (and presumably
Defendant Ribi). Former Mayor Willich was entitled to an attorney who was loyal only to him.
Instead, Attorney Naylor acted with disdain and belligerence towards his putative client Former
Mayor Willich, violating several ethics codes in the process (i.e. I.R.P.C. J.2(a) (abiding by
directions of client); I.R.P.C. 1.4 (communicating with client); and, I.R.C.P. 8.4(c) and (d)
(misrepresentation and prejudicial conduct)). Attorney Naylor did not act like an attorney who
had a legitimate attorney-client relationship with Former Mayor Willich, especially in regards to
the Ball Investigation, and should not receive the benefits of that fictitious relationship. Former
Mayor Willich had every right, under the circumstances, to reject Attorney Naylor as his, and the
142 Former Mayor Willich goes as far as asserting that he was "manipulated" (Willich Dep., Pg. 49, Line 22 to Line
25; Rec. 1182) and "hustled'' (Willich Dep., Pg. 73, Line 16 to 17; Rec. i 188) by Attorney Naylor.
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Willich Administration's, attorney.
As was stated in Muncey v. Children's Home, Attorney Naylor's authority "must be
established, which has not been done." Attorney Naylor's own conduct during the Post Election
Period, and his refusal to follow the directions or Former Mayor Willich, is the best indicator that
no legitimate attorney client relationship ever formed between Former Mayor Willich or the
Willich Administration and Attorney Naylor during the Post Election Period.
SE) Attorney Naylor Assisted First Defendant Ribi, Then Defendant Briscoe And The Briscoe
Administration, In Seeking A Retaliatory And Unwarranted Criminal Investigation Of Ms.
Hammer. Thus, No Attorney-Client Privilege Exists Because Of The Crime Fraud Exception.
Pursuant to I.R.E. 502(d)(l) any claims of attorney-client privilege are lost when "the
attorney's services are sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit
what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud."
The Record On Appeal makes clear that Attorney Naylor became a participant, with
Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe, in seeking an unauthorized and unwarranted referral to
the Blaine County Prosecutor seeking a criminal prosecution of Ms. Hammer, on behalf of
ICRMP and Defendant Ribi, as a defense strategy against Ms. Hammer's civil claims.
Former Mayor Willich confirmed that Attorney Naylor was seeking to find any excuse to
assert that Ms. Hammer committed any criminal conduct as a defense against Ms. Hammer's
legitimate harassment and retaliation claims against Defendant Ribi 143 . Attorney Naylor's
motives were not legitimate, as Former Mayor Willich and the Sun Valley City Council had
approved all of Ms. Hammer's actions which Attorney Naylor asserted were criminal. As a

143

Willich Compel Aff., Para. 40, 47, 70, 77, 79; Rec. 303,305,310,311.312.
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former prosecutor himself, Attorney Naylor should have known better.
Attorney Naylor never received instructions from either Former Mayor Willich 144 or the
Sun Valley City Council 145 to seek a criminal investigation of Ms. Hammer. In fact, the Blaine
County Prosecutor confirmed that Attorney Naylor had asked for a criminal prosecution of Ms.
Hammer as ICRMP's attorne/ 46 , not as Sun Valley's Attorney. Attorney Naylor also was the
author of press releases and paid advertisements announcing that his client, the Briscoe
Administration, was seeking that Ms. Hammer be criminally prosecuted 147 . Attorney Naylor
crossed a line from simply giving legal advice, to actively participating in the retaliation against
Ms. Hammer.
The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege provides that attorney-client
protections are lost if the attorney's actions assist the client in perpetrating either a crime or a
fraud, U.S. v. Gorski, 2015 WL 8285086, 6 (U.S. App.I st 2015). The fraudulent activity need not
itself rise to the level of a crime, nor does the fraud or criminal conduct need to be completed, it
merely needs to be "planned", In Re: Grand Jury Subpoena, 731 F.2d 1032, 1039 (U.S. App.2nd
1984). As the U.S. 211 d District Appellate Court stated in In Re: Grand Jury Subpoena

@

1039

"The fraudulent nature of the objective need not be established definitively; there need only be
presented a reasonable basis for believing that the objective was fraudulent."
Ms. Hammer asserts that Defendant Ribi's, Defendant Briscoe's and Attorney Naylor's
joint efforts in seeking an unwarranted criminal investigation of Ms. Hammer, for conduct that
Willich Compel Aff., Para. 79, Rec. 312.
Lamb Dep., Rec. 1371.
146 See Blaine County Prosecutor letter of November 21, 2012 (Rec. 430-434 ).
147 Rec. 961; Briscoe Dep., Pg. 144, Line 22 to Pg. 145, Line 24. Rec. 1254.
144

145
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been approved by Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe themselves, rose to the level of
fraud as is contemplated by I.R.E. 502(d)(l )148 , thus negating any claims that Attorney Naylor's
conduct or communications were attorney-client protected.
The Waiver Of Both Attorney-Client And Work Product Privileges
Both the attorney-client privilege, In Re: Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (U.S. D.C.App.
1982) and the work product privilege, U.S. v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239, 95 S.Ct. 2160 (U.S.
Sup.Ct. 1975) can be waived by various acts of the litigants including by the disclosure of
documents (In Re: Sealed Case

@

809). Once the privilege is waived, it is waived as to all

communications relevant to the matter at issue, Skelton v. Spencer, 98 Idaho 417,421 565 P.2d
1372 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1977); Weil v. Investment/Indicators, 647 F.2d 18, 24 (U.S. App.9th 1981).
SF) Former Mayor Willick And The Briscoe Administration Have Waived Any AttorneyClient Or Work Product Protections Related To The Ball Investigation By The Release And
Publication Of The Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report, And The Substantial Disclosures
Regarding The Ball Investigation In Affidavits And Depositions.
Sun Valley and the Briscoe Administration have waived any attorney-client or work
product protections they may have possessed in regards to the Ball Investigation in six (6) ways.
First, the extensive disclosures by Former Mayor Willich of his relationship with, and
conversations he held with, Attorney Naylor, especially his extensive disclosure of the December
16, 2011 meeting Former Mayor Willich held with Attorney Naylor in his Affidavit In Support
Of Motion To Compel (Rec. 293-316), waives any possible attorney-client privilege Former
148

The criminal claims against Ms. Hammer by Attorney Naylor and Sun Valley officials were so frivolous that the
Blaine County Prosecutor did not even present the claims of Attorney Naylor and Sun Valley officials to a grand
jury (Rec. 430-434). Ms. Hammer asserts that Attorney Naylor, a former prosecutor. who improperly continued to
act like one, should have known of the frivolous nature of the criminal allegations.
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Mayor Willich or Sun Valley may have had with Attorney Naylor during the Post Election
Period, and thus in regards to the entire Ball Investigation which occurred during that period.
Second, the submission of communications related to a party opponent, to an outside
third party, even to a government entity, waives both the attorney client and work product
privileges as to that party opponent (see extensive discussion in Westinghouse Elec:. Corp. v.
Republic Of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423-1431 (U.S. App.3d 1991), finding that

Westinghouse waived attorney-client and work product privilege when it voluntarily released
otherwise protected documents to government entities related to investigations). The waiver,
waives any attorney-client privilege or work product privileges related to that matter, (In Re:
Sealed Case @809). The Briscoe Administration's and Attorney Naylor's providing of the

Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report to the Blaine County Prosecutor, waives any further attorneyclient or work product privileges that can be claimed by the Briscoe Administration or Attorney
Naylor related to the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report or the Ball Investigation.
Third, the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report was published in its entirety in the Idaho
Mountain Express for approximately a year, and was extensively quoted in a Boise Weekly

article of March 13, 2013 (which is still available on-line). The Briscoe Administration has
inferred that the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report was provided to the Idaho Mountain Express
by the Blaine County Prosecutor. But, there is nothing in the Record On Appeal confirming that
insinuation. Regardless of how the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report was provided to the Idaho
Mountain Express, and whether it was purposeful or inadvertent, the release and publication of

the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report waived any attorney-client or work product privilege that
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have been associated with the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report or the Ball Investigation.
Fourth, during all of the depositions of the various Sun Valley officials during the
summer of 2014, each official extensively discussed the Ball Investigation, and the parameters of
discussions related to the Ball Investigation, the Original Ball/Naylor Report and the
Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report, which occurred during the eight (8) extensive, closed door
Sun Valley City Council executive sessions between November 11, 2011 and January 19,
2012 149 . All of this was done while Attorney Naylor sat in the depositions as counsel to the
various Sun Valley officials. The disclosure by the various Sun Valley officials of the substantial
discussions related to the Ball Investigation during their depositions, waives any and all attorneyclient or work product protections that may have been associated with the Ball Investigation.
Fifth, several Sun Valley officials, and in particular, Defendant Briscoe 150 , Defendant
Ribi 151 , and Former Council Member Lamb 152 , asserted "advice of counsel" as reasons for why
several decisions were made. The raising of "advice of counsel" as a factor in a matter, waives
any attorney-client or work product protections that may have been asserted related to the
matters at issue, In Re: Echostar Communications, 448 F.3d 1294, 1298-1299 (U.S. Fed.App.
2006); U.S. v. Moazzeni, 906 F.Supp.2d 505, 512 (U.S. E.D.Virg. 2012). Therefore, the claim by

Willich Dep., Rec. 1170-1216: Briscoe Dep., Rec. 1218-1264' Ribi Dep., Rec. 1266-1312: Youngman Dep.,
Rec .. 1314-1337; Suhadolnik Dep .• Rec. 1339-1354; Lamb Dep., Rec. 1356-1374.
150 Ms. Hammer was terminated based on advice of Attorney Naylor and City Attorney King (Briscoe Dep .. Pg. 152153, Rec. 1256). Ms. Hammer was not provided a name clearing hearing based on advice of legal counsel Clayton
Gill (Briscoe Dep., Pg. 165, Rec. 1259). Press Release announcing that Sun Valley was seeking a criminal
investigation of Ms. Hammer prepared by Attorney Naylor (Briscoe Dep., Pg. 145, Rec. 1254).
151 Legal advice provided to Sun Valley City Council that terminating Ms. Hammer "without cause" would negate
having to disclose the real reasons for Ms. Hammer's termination (Ribi Dep., Pg. 91, Rec. 1289).
152 City Attorney King was adamant that the Sun Valley City Council should terminate Ms. Hammer for misconduct
(Lamb Dep., Pg. 15-17, Rec. 1360).
149
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Valley officials that certain actions were taken by Defendant Ribi, Defendant Briscoe, Sun
Valley or the Briscoe Administration on the "advice of counsel", waives any attorney-client or
work product protections that may have been associated with the Ball Investigation.
Sixth, the Briscoe Administration asserted in its Fourteenth Defense (Rec. 201) that Ms.
Hammer committed "careless or criminal misconduct, thereby precluding recovery". As Sun
Valley will be using the allegations of Ms. Hammer's misconduct, covered by the Ball
Investigation, as a defense, all matters related to the Ball Investigation are subject to discovery,
Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (U.S. E.D.Wash. 1975) - privilege is waived where the

asserting party puts the protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case.
Other Disclosure Issues
SG) Any In Camera Documents Or Emails That Describe The Nature O(Services Provided Or
Tasks To Be Performed By Attorney Naylor Or Investigator Ball Must Be Disclosed.
In seeking to protect communications related to the Ball Investigation, the Briscoe
Administration submitted two sets of in camera documents to the District Court (SV In Camera
1-37; SV In Camera 38-64). They were presented to show that Attorney Naylor or Investigator
Ball had some form of attorney-client relationship with Former Mayor Willich or Sun Valley.
Ms. Hammer was not privy to those documents. Nor was Former Mayor Willich even allowed to
review the in camera communications to certify their legitimacy or purpose.
That an attorney-client relationship has arisen or the specific authorization for its creation
are not privileged subjects, National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 384
F.2d 316,318 (U.S. D.C.App. 1967) (citing Wigmore On Evidence). Communications
describing the work performed by the attorney, or the purpose for the work, Clarke v. Anierican
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Commerce National Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (U.S. App.9th 1992), or which relate to the "terms

and conditions of an attorney's employment, the purpose for which an attorney has been
engaged, the steps which an attorney took or intended to take in discharging his obligation" are
simply not protected communications, In Re: LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595, 603 (U.S.
N.D.Tex 1981); Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources Corp., 801 P.2d 909,912
(Utah Sup.Ct. 1990). The rule as to privileged communications does not exclude evidence as to
the instructions or authority given by the client to his attorney to be acted upon by the latter,
Henshall v. Coburn, 177 Cal. 50, 54, 169 P. 1014 (Cal. Sup.Ct. 1917), or the "steps'' or "acts or

services" taken or to be taken by the attorney, Gold Standard v. American Barrick

@

912; In Re:

Universal Service Fund Litigation, 232 F.R.D. 669, 675 (U.S. Kansas 2005).

As the in camera documents were submitted to the District Court to show that an
attorney-client relationship of some sort existed, what the parameters of that relationship were,
and what the tasks were that were assigned to either Investigator Ball or Attorney Naylor, they
are not entitled to attorney-client or work product protections, and thus, must be produced.
SH) Any In Camera Communications Which Are Not Verified As Being Legitimate By
Former Mayor Willich Cannot Be Considered To Establish The Privileges Claimed.
Ms. Hammer is at an extreme disadvantage by not being allowed to review the in camera
documents. Former Mayor Willich's Affidavit 153 conforms that he may have never seen or sent
many of the communications, or that they are otherwise not legitimate or credible.
It is inconceivable that the District Court granted attorney-client or work product
153

Ms. Hammer requests the Court to read the entire Willich Supp. Compel Aff. (Rec. 769-777) to understand the
extent to which Former Mayor Willich denies he sought legal advice from Attorney Naylor, or admits to the giving
or receiving of the communications submitted in camera or described in the Privilege Log.
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privileges to all communications based on the in camera documents which one of the parties to
the communications (i.e. Former Mayor Willich) refuses to verify as legitimate. Any of the
unverified communications to or from Former Mayor Willich must be considered as hearsay, and
thus rejected and not considered by the Court in determining whether any privilege exists.
51) Any Unrequested Legal Advice Is Not Attorney-Client Protected.
Ms. Hammer asserts that the Court must review each individual communication to
determine whether it was legal advice that had been specifically sought by Former Mayor
Willich. If the communication was not legal advice that had been specifically sought by Former
Mayor Willich, the communication cannot be a protected communication.
There are only eleven (11) email communications from Former Mayor Willich to either
Attorney Naylor or Investigator Ball in the Privilege Log 154 . If none of the communications
specifically sought legal advice from Attorney Naylor, then advice Attorney Naylor may have
volunteered to Former Mayor Willich (or Investigator Ball) is simply not attorney-client
protected (see In Re: Grand Jury Proceedings,

@

1355). Attorney Naylor cannot justify the

formation of an attorney-client relationship between himself and Former Mayor Willich by
sending unsolicited, and un-responded to, legal advice to Former Mayor Willich.
SJ) The Privilege Log Was Insufficient.
When a litigant objects to the production of discovery, pursuant to I.R. C.P. 26(b )(5 )(A),
the litigant must document what the communications or documents are that are being protected,
and the reason for such protection, in what is generally described as a privilege log. In the

154

Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 7. Rec. 77 l.
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Privilege Log (Rec. 502-517), the Briscoe Administration provided an extensive list of email
communications related to the Ball Investigation it claimed required protection. The Privilege
Log merely describes emails by date, who they are from and to, what type of protection is
claimed (all of which are indicated as "Attorney Client Communication/Work Product"), and
whether they were a "Factual Request" or "Investigation Administration".
The labeling of emails as a "Factual Request", itself, requires the production of those
emails, as facts are not protected by an attorney-client or work product protection, Upjohn Co. v.
U.S., 101 S.Ct. 677, 685-686 (U.S. Sup.Ct. 1980). Even facts provided to an attorney by its

experts in preparation for litigation are not privileged (see I.R. C.P. 26(b )( 4 )(A )(3 )(ii)). And, as to
the emails designated "Investigation Administration", the steps, acts or services to be performed
or actually performed by an attorney or its agents are also not protected (as is described above).
In order for the Privilege Log to be sufficient, it was required to have described the nature
of each separate email such that Ms. Hammer could assess the privilege claim asserted,
Executive Management Services v. F(fth Third Bank, 2015 WL 4758696, 8 (U.S. S.D. Ind. 2015),

including a "general description of the subject matter" of the communication(@ 9). Conclusory
assertions of privilege are insufficient to support a privilege claim, Johnson v. Ford Motor Co.,
2015 WL 5111332, @3 (U.S. S.D.W.Virg. 2015). If the communication is claimed as attorneyclient protected, the privilege log must include a "clear showing" that the communication
specifically involved the providing of legal advice, In Re: Vioxx Products Liability Litigation,
501 F.Supp.2d 789, 797 (U.S. E.D.La. 2007). If the communication is claimed as work product
protected, the description of the subject matter of the communication must include "competent
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evidence" supporting any assertion that the communication specifically related to "the course of
litigation or was in anticipation of a threat of adversarial litigation that was real and imminent"
(In Re: Universal Service Fund Litigation @ 673). A party's conclusory assertion that a
communication constitutes opinion work product is insufficient to establish that the
communication is work product privileged, Koumoulis v. Ind. Fin. Mkt. @ 39. The failure to
provide a sufficient privilege log results in a waiver of the privilege sought, Exec. Mgt. Svcs v.
F~fth Third @9; Moe v. System Transport, Inc., 270 F.R.D. 613,623 (U.S. Mont. 2010).
All entries in the Privilege Log fail to provide any description of the subject matter of the
communication (other than "Factual Request" or ''Investigation Administration"). If the
communication is asserted to be attorney-client protected, there is no "clear showing" that it
involved some form of legal advice. If the communication is asserted to be work product
protected, it fails to provide the certification of how it was specifically related to imminent
litigation. As the Privilege Log fails to comply with disclosure requirements, any and all
privileges associated with the communications in the Privilege Log are waived.

SK) The Global Exemption For All Communications Was Improper. Each Email And Other
Communication Must Be Reviewed By The District Court Before A Privilege Is Allowed.
The District Court's findings (Supp.Rec. 15-25; Rec. 809-818) gave all communications
related to the Ball Investigation a global privilege, based both on attorney-client privilege and
work product privileges, based on the in camera sample of documents. In U.S. v. Lawless, 709
F.2d 485,487 (U.S. App.ih 1983) the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court Of Appeals stated: "The claim
of privilege must be made on a question-by-question or document-by-document basis; a blanket
claim of privilege is unacceptable. The scope of the privilege should be 'strictly confined within

68
APPELLANT'S AMENDED BRIEF

the narrowest possible limits' "(citing Wigmore on Evidence). As burdensome as it may be, the
District Court erred by not reviewing each email in the Privilege Log, even if it was in camera,
to determine whether each email qualified for either the attorney-client or work product privilege
asserted by the Briscoe Administration. Even within each email, the District Court was obligated
to redact any portion of the email that deserves either attorney-client or work product protection,
and require the disclosure of the rest of the email (see U.S. v. Christensen, 801 F.3d 970, 1008
(U.S App.9 1h 2015) where the U.S Ninth Circuit Appellate Court stated: "If the nonprivileged
portions of a communication are distinct and severable, and their disclosure would not
effectively reveal the substance of the privileged legal portions, the court must designate which
portions of the communication are protected and therefore may be excised or redacted prior to
disclosure" ( citing Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege)).
The District Court's global protection of all Ball Investigation related communications
violated the District Court's obligation to review each email described in the Privilege Log to
determine whether it actually qualified for either an attorney-client or work product privilege,
and whether portions of emails that did not qualify for either privilege should be disclosed.

ISSUE VI) Did the District Court err in entering costs against the Appellant?
Because the District Court entered summary judgment against Ms. Hammer, on July 2,
2015, the District Court also assessed $8,281.15 in costs against Ms. Hammer (Rec. 231). Should
the Court reverse the District Court's findings and remand the matter(s) back to the District
Court, Ms. Hammer requests that the Court also vacate the Order entering costs against Ms.
Hammer and mandate that any costs already paid by Ms. Hammer to Sun Valley be rebated.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe both approved all of Ms. Hammer's actions and
conduct as the Sun Valley City Administrator while members of the Sun Valley City Council,
including in regards to her use of compensatory time and a Sun Valley auto. However, they acted
as if, as members of the newly installed Briscoe Administration (as opposed to the Willich
Administration), that they were "the government" and that their fraudulent criminal claims
against Ms. Hammer were somehow legitimate, exempting them from any repercussions when
their criminal claims against Ms. Hammer turned out to be false. Their conduct in terminating
Ms. Hammer and seeking an unwarranted criminal investigation of Ms. Hammer was an
extension of the on-going bullying and harassment Ms. Hammer suffered at Defendant Ribi's
hands, and is primafacie evidence of the retaliatory conduct of both, which violated the "adverse
action" provisions of the IPPEA.
The mere mention of an investigation of a public employee, which includes ''criminal"
allegations, is a death sentence to the employee's career, especially for a city administrator.
Although exonerated of criminal allegations, the findings of the Blaine County Prosecutor did
not help Ms. Hammer get her job back or make up for the extensive financial damages and
emotional injuries she suffered at the hands of Defendant Ribi, Defendant Briscoe and Attorney
Naylor. As Raymond Donovan said regarding an unwarranted investigation of his conduct as the
U.S. Secretary Of Labor - "which office do I go to to get my reputation back?" The IPPEA was
intended to right these types of retaliatory wrongs inflicted upon a public employee in Idaho.
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As to the main issue on appeal, namely, the waiver issue, Attorney Naylor and the
Briscoe Administration demanded that Ms. Hammer provide a release that waived "all claims" and paid her the "severance" even when she did not. Ms. Hammer's submission of the
Supplemental Release, retaining the right to continue to bring certain claims she did not intend to
waive when she signed the Employment Agreement in 2008 (including IPEA claims), even if the
Briscoe Administration paid her the "severance", is certainly not the "clear and unequivocal act
manifesting an intent to waive" that Justice Burdick described in Knipe Land v. Roberston (@
457-458). Attorney Naylor's and the Briscoe Administration's conduct in asserting that Ms.
Hammer somehow released "all claims" anyway, is consistent with their conduct in also making
false criminal claims against Ms. Hammer as part of their litigation defense strategy, requiring
that Ms. Hammer spend the greater part of four (4) years litigating the matter. That conduct
should not be condoned by the Court. Ms. Hammer prays that the Court vacate the District
Court's summary judgment findings that she waived any right to bring claims under the IPPEA,
and instead enter summary judgment in her favor that she preserved her right to bring claims
under the IPPEA, even though the Briscoe Administration voluntarily chose to pay the
"severance", and remand the matter back to the District Court with instructions reflecting such.
Ms. Hammer also prays that the Court find that the post termination conduct of the
Briscoe Administration is actionable under the IPPEA. Ms. Hammer prays that the Court vacate
the judicial estoppel findings of the District Court. And, Ms. Hammer prays that the Court find
that Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe can be held personally liable under the IPPEA for
taking adverse actions against Ms. Hammer. Ms. Hammer prays that the Court remand the matter
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back to the District Court with directions related to all of the above.
As to work product discovery issues, in depositions held after the District Court issued its
findings that Ball Investigation related communications were protected by work product
privileges, almost every Sun Valley elected official, including Defendant Ribi and Defendant
Briscoe themselves, admitted that the Ball Investigation was, first and foremost, an internal
disciplinary investigation related to the misconduct allegations against Ms. Hammer, and that the
Ball Investigation was not commenced because of threatened litigation. Attorney Naylor was not
even appointed by ICRMP until after the Ball Investigation was commenced and Ms. Hammer
filed suit because of the commencement of the Ball Investigation and that she was placed on
administrative leave. The Ball Investigation would have proceeded whether Ms. Hammer filed
suit or not. That being the case, the District Court's findings that all Ball Investigation
communications were work product protected was in error.
As to attorney-client discovery issues, after his appointment by ICRMP, hand in hand
with Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe, Attorney Naylor aggressively and publicly made
false criminal claims against Ms. Hammer as a litigation strategy to protect Defendant Ribi and
ICRMP, in violation of I.R.P.C. 4.4(a)(4), and in direct violation of the directives of his other
putative client Former Mayor Willich. Attorney Naylor became a co-conspirator in the retaliation
against Ms. Hammer by Defendant Ribi, Defendant Briscoe and the Briscoe Administration,
requiring the loss of any attorney-client privilege claims. In addition, because he was rejected by
Former Mayor Willich as Sun Valley's appointed counsel because of conflicts, no attorney-client
privileges related to Attorney Naylor during the Willich Administration should have been
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granted. At a minimum, no attorney-client privileges should be granted related to the Ball
Investigation, as Attorney Naylor was provided no authority related to the Ball Investigation.
Ms. Hammer prays that the Court finds that Sun Valley and Attorney Naylor are not
entitled to any of the work product or attorney-client privileges the District Court granted,
especially in regards to the Ball Investigation, and remand the matter back to the District Court
with directions to require the production of the documents and communications previously
granted protection from disclosure.
Finally, Ms. Hammer prays that the Court vac9te}he
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THIS CITY ADMINIST.R.ATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT hen:%inafter
«Agreement'\ effective the 1st
June 2008> hy and
the CITY OF SUN
VALLEY,
SHARON
following:

W.clEREAS. Employer
to employ
Am:ninilrtrator
City of SUll Valley (<°City");

WHEREAS, Employee
to
n,,.. ,""'"'"'+-to the terms and conditions hereof
NOW. THEREFORE.
contair1ed.
the above ,.'-"""'-'Id;!,'":,

Employer hereby
of Sun
to perform the
Employer, through the Mayor,
thn,ron1a1t1v. competently

with the

llij;tlleSt

ru:iministraror 'With Employee's bac:k:grc'.fun1d, 01llalt:1:Icsitioit1s

expectEM:I

2.
A.
Employee's Employment
shall report to work no later than June 23, 2008,

commence

1, 2008. Employee

B..
Nothing in this Agreement
prevent, limit or otherwise interfere
right of the Employer to termin&e the ""'"·"""~ of Employee under the applicable
provisions of Section 3 below.
with

C.
Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent, limit or othe!Wise interfere
with the right of the Employee to resign at any time from her position wtth Employer. subject
only to the notice provision set forth in Section 3, Subsection c. of this Agreement.

r::,.

CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT - l

•····

6114/2008 4:01 PM
s20!14.0101.1:i.oaooo.e
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B.
In the event Employee is terminated for "cause". then Employer shall
not be obligated to make any severance payment to Employee. ••cause" is defined as (i) a
material breach of this Agreen1ent; (ii) repeated neglect of Employee' s duties as City
Administrator; or {iii) misconduct such as theft, dishonesty\\~fraud, misrepresentation,

embezzlement or other acts ofvvilifu1 1nisconduct. moral turpitude or criminal conduct.
C.
Unless the parties otherwise agree. if Employee voluntarily resigns her
position with Employer, lhen Employee shall give Employer tbree (3) mon1hs notice in
advance; provided Employer may waive such three month advance notice in its discretion. In
the event of a voluntary resignation, Employee shall not be entitled to any severance payment
unless the Mayor shall decide otherwise U1 his sole discretion.
If Employee applies for employment elsewhere. and during the term of her
employment hereunder is included in a list of ten or fewer candidates still under consideration
for suoh employment. then. upon learning of her inclusion in such a list,. Employee shall
promptly inform the Mayor and each member of the City Council, which shall be confidential
insofar as is pennitted by applicable law.
D.
In the event Employee is tennfriated by Employer, acting through the
Mayor, for any .reason. then Employer shall pay Employee, at the rate of compensation then
being earned by Employee. all accrued and unused vacation entitlement in accordance with
the then current policy for City Department Heads.

CITY ADMINIBTRATOR.EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT - 2

5/14/2006 4:01 PM
32084.0101.1208900.6
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reauce:d by the .,_,,,,,,:.uu,
02) months. If
suffers any 1Jw4!.J.!Q.U<;;.t!L U.!.i><U.JUHV
otherwise unable to perform her duties then sick leave, vacation, not:1ct8i1s
time,
benefits shall cease to accrue

During the course of Employee's term of
Employees~
System
CPERSI''),
Employee,
accordance with
Employer for
Employer generaily.

per month.
SECTION 6.

SICKLEAVE AND VACATION

A.
Upon commencement of employment, Employee shall have credited to
leave and thereafter shall accrue sick leave at the
her personal account forty (40) hours of
same rate as City Department Heads employed by the City.

B.
The leave entitlement granted to Employee pursuant to Subsection A of
this Section 6 shall be used by Employee for time attributable to recovery from an illness or
injury only and not as additional vacation time. If such sick leave is not used, it shall continue
CITY ADMINISTRATOR Elv.1:PLOYMEN"T AGREEMENT - 3

6/14/2008 4:01 PM
32064.0101.1206900.6
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such entitlement shall not accrue ,,c:;vuuu
respect to the same vu,.u,,,,.u.,,au,
entitled to be paid

Upon com:mencement
oerson,al account forty

Employer shall reimburse Employee•s direct expenses
the Wood River Valley, as substantiated by receipts. up to $15,000.00.

relocating to

INDEMN1FICATION
Consistent with Idaho Code § 6~903, City agrees to indemnify and hold
harmless Employee from claims. liabilities. or causes of action brought against Employee
which
related to the course and scope of Employee•s employment or which arise out of
any act or omission within the course and scope of Employee's employnient~ provided, the
City
refuse defense or disavow
to pay any judgment for Employee it is

CITY ADM!NISTRATOR EMPLOYNIBN'I' AGREEMENT. 4

6114/2008 4:0i PM
32064.0101.12-06000.6
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was not

course

per·sona! service or as
course of transmission in. the United

by
ofthe
Postal Service.
SECTION

A.

The text herein shall constitute the entire agreement between ·the

parties.

B.
uru:mnstituti<Jnal.

If any provision> or any no1ctton thereof. in this Agreement is held
or unenfurceabl~ the
of this Agreement, or portion

.u,,,,,:u,u

CITY ADMINJSTRATOR E.i\l!PLOYJM:ENT AGREEMENT~ 5

6/1412000 4:01 PM
32054.0101. f:208000.6
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not

and

written.

CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMJ>LO"YMENT AGREEMENT - 6

5/1412008 4:01 PM
32064.0101.1208900,(l
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payment of the severance payment required pursuant to Section 3.A. of the City Administrator

Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008, I release the City Of Sun Valley fur any claims defined in
dministrator Employment Agreement as were intended when the City

isJ;tatqti:A'ti~~nt Agreement was entered into on .lune 1, 2008.

, Wltn~£7}~
I

I
l
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Administrator Contract

http;//mail .aoLco~38~21 I/ao!-6/en-us/rnail/PrintMessage.aspx

000263
From: jdonoval <jdonovaf@aol.com>
To: krrt <klrt@naylorhales.com>

Su!,iec:t: Re: City Administrator Contract
Date: Fri, Jan 13, 2012 10:14 am

Kirt:
If the City is going to terminate Sharon without cause her contract does not require her to waive any tort or any
other non contract claims she may have with the City. So if the City is going to terminate her without cause, we
should work on a separation agreement that has the correct waiver language in it, and get it over with.

if the City is going to try to terminate her with cause, especially without any hearings or anything, you know that is
going to face continued litigation regarding that issue alone.
As to your other email, Sharon and I have given you several settlement offers that you have dismissed outright,
especially during Mayor Willich's tenure, and I have asked on several occasions to sit with you and your client and
you have refused - so we did not believe we were incorrect in filing the pleading.
l would much rather have you provide me the settlement terms rather than the other way around, as thus far you
have rejected anything we have put before you and have not countered. Please note that if you want a settlement of
all matters, including any tort or IPPEA claims Sharon has, we are expecting that it also includes a dismissal of Mr.
Ribi's and Ms. Rlbi's claims against me. And regardless of the language, we thought that dismissing the suit first
was a good faith effort to settle the issues.
Finally Kirt, there have been assertions all over the place of everyone doing bad acts. I am sorry for that. And you
have probably not even been privy to some of the things that I have been subject to from Mr. Roark. However, the
community here thinks this is a travesty and a waste of money and not what governments are supposed to be doing.
However, if we are going to get to some resolution to this, it needs to give Sharon back her reputation. No one is
going to win on every issue and we need to discuss the matters to get it resolved. I don't care if you record our
conversations. But as much as we do not see eye to eye - we both need to get to some common ground otherwise
this is going to go on forever.
Best Regards
JIM

Please call me when you get this to start working on where we are going ..

-----Original Message-From: Kirtlan Naylor <l<ir.t@naylorhales.com>
To: jdonoval <idonoval@aol.com>
Sent Thu, Jan 12, 2012 7:32 pm
Subject: RE: City Administrator Contract

You may make any offer in writing to me. And I will communicate it to my clients.

Kirt/an G. Naylor
Direct 208 947-2070

"' ~ .~.~~:~.!,:.~ <:~~.~,!;: ,.~:.~:~
Thi; email is a confidential communica1ion.
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le: Resolution follow up

--

From: jdonoval <jdoooval@aol.oom>
To: kirt <kirt@~tes.com>
.:im~,:c Re: Resolution follow up
Date:
Jan
2012 7:30 am

Nils Ribi law suit is not an issue - I wm fight that myself.
If the City Council teminates Sharon oo Thursday, we will be in Court immediately to see whether your theory of no
And regardless of whether you terminate her "without cause" - she has a property interest in
her employment which we will 1111111ediateiy seek to enforce. And of course I wil immediately re-file the IPPEA claims.
Is that
you realty want - to oontim.ie litigation over this?

,.,-.,,.~r.t extension flies.

JIM

:lammer v. Sun

http://mail.ao1.a

5138-211/aol-6/en-us/mail/PrintMessage.aspx

From:
<jdonoval@aol.rorrP'
To: kirt <kirt@naylorhales.com>

"'1"',F"'i.; Hammer v. Sun \alley
Dam:

2012 7:49 pm

I assume that you are also cognitive of the fact that if you lose the argument that Sharon is not entitled to the six
month severance
that under 45--615 you may be subjecting the City Of SI.Ill \/alley to treble damages, and it
may eventually cost SI.Ill \/alley about $200,000 in contract damages alone.
JIM

ofl

1/18/2012 12;36 PM
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http://mail.aol.co1

From:

·138,,,21 l/aol-6/en-m/mail/PdntMessage.asp:

<jdoooval@aol.com>

To: kirt <kirt@naylomales.com>
Conversation
20122:03pm

J wiil foiward your offer to Ms. Hammer.
In the meanwhile, I am requesting that you retain the recording of today's oonversation as I bejieve that yoo
mentioned that one, if not the only, reason that the City is contemplating termination action against Ms, Hammer is
because she filed a !aw suit. As the only two actions are the IPPEA law suit {which she had a right to file and hes a
right to re-file) and the Ht.man Rights complaint (which is stm pending), that evidence lends credence to the question
of whether she is being terminated in retaliation for making valid claims against the City or Mr. Ribi. I do not want to
"parse words" and therefore want to be sure of e:xacity what you said today in that oommrsation. Could yoo please
provide me with a copy the transcript of today's telephone call.
Best Regards and Thank You
JIM DONOVAL

1/18/2012 2:03 PM
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None Condos;
P0Box1499

Sun Valley, ID 83353

(lll)

(2.08) 121~1383

Mr. Kirtlan Naylor

950 W. Barmodc St., Suite 610
Boise, iD 83702

Re:

Sharon R. Hammer Contract And Termination

Dear Mr. Naylor:

! want ro reiterate and adld to some of the
diseussioll"!.

that we mentioned in o!!Jr just completed

First, should the City Of Sun Valley seek to terminate Ms. Hammer's contract without cause, and
pay her the severance payment described therein, the language related to such states : "The severance
payment herein is intended to be the Employee's sole exch.llsive remedy fur any and all claims of
damages of any kind arising from a termination without cause and such severance payment is hereby
agreed to be reasonable, fair and equitable by both parties to this Agreement. Accordingly, Employee
waives her right to bring a claim of any kind for damages against

arising from a termination

without cause. Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is subject to execution of a release of all
claims against the City Of Sun Valley." Please note that this language was drafted by then Sun Valley City
Attorney Rand Peebles. As I have stated, the causes of action Ms. Hammer possesses for tort, indudlng
the underlying harassment allegations against Council Member Ribi and several other claims, do not
arise "from a termination", they arise out of separate incidents. Nor is it rational to assert that Ms.
Hammer would have waived any non-contract damage claims she would have prospectively been
entitied to {i.e. personal injury claims) when she signed the agreement. So as I have stated, if the City Of
Sun Valley proposes to terminate Ms. Hammer without cause and pay her the severance payment in the
contract, she will only

a waiver that states the exact language in the contract cited above and

nothing moreo
i also want to r,;;;,rnm,n
Wiiiich

the Sun

on at least two separate occasions
Ms. Hammer has provided notice

Bali and to Mayor
Ms. Frostenson has

c:ne,,l"?.,,l'i!

her retirement aerount

and that Ms. frost:enson has failed to accrue 120 hours of

sab,!Jatiral vaarticm Ms. Hammer was entitled to (and was

fur) in June of 2011 equaling $6,832.

ensure that if the City Of Sun Valley terminates Ms. Hammer that those errors are corrected as
part of Ms. Hammer's final termination payment.
If the City Of Sun Valley terminates Ms. Hammer with aiuse, or asserts that the contract is
invalid or expired, then of oourse she does not waive any daims of any sort, including in regards to the

contract itself.
Again, I want to remind you that should Ms. Hammer be required to litigate any matters related
to Ms. Hammer's severance, then

is the potential that she would be entitled to treble damages

and attorneys fees for the 1..mpaid amounts pursuant to Idaho Statutes 45-615. Also, please oote that
should Ms. Hammer be terminated, she is making demand for payment of all compensation due within
forty eight hours (48) as is required by Idaho Statutes 45-606.

v:~tYours~
~lv';. v,ft

1k,a,r
Jd:~
Cc:

S. Hammer

z

SHARON .HAMMER
Fnllfnilll!'aV

Nine Cf:111fta~

1499
Vallev. ID 83353

(312) 985-0249
sharonmammer@aol.com
January 20, 2012
City Of Sun Valley

c/o City Clerk Kelly Ek
Sun Valley City Hall
Sun Valley, ID 83353

Sharon R. Hammer-48 Hour Severance Payment Demand Pursuant To fidah-~ Statute 45-606
City Of Sun Valley:
At approximately 5:30 p.m. on Thursday, Jam.sary 19, 2012, the Su111 Valley City Council, at the
request of Mayor Dewayne Briscoe, terminated the existing City AdmiJi!lsti:ator Employment Agreement
\,, ~
:;
{the "'Agreement") between me and the Qty Sun Valley, pursuant to Sed:ion 3A of such Agreement
Therefore, I am requesting payment of all wages and compensation due within 48 hours, or by 10:00
a.m. Tuesday, January 24, 2012, as Is required by Idaho Statutes 45--606.

Wages and compensation are as follows:
a} Pursuant to Section 3A of the 11,;1:11«·-1'1fl!l:!>!M' I am demanding payment for six months

compensation;
b) I am demanding payment of four days of salary for the period of January 16, 2012 through
January 19, 2012, the date of termination of the Agreement, or the equivalent of $1,858.88, at my
current pay rate of $58.09 per hour;

c) I am demanding payment of 188.88 hours of accrued vacation1 as is detailed on my payroll

records, equaling $10,972.04, at my current pay rate of $5lt09 per hour;
d) I am demanding payment for 40 hours of vacation time I was mandated to request

the

pay period ending December 18, 2011, because Mayor Wllllch instructed me to submit: a request fur
vacation during the "administrative leave" period. The amount for this 40 hours equals $2,323.60 at my
current pay rate of $58.09 per hour;

OD
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e) I am

payment for UO hem~ of sabbatical WC/Jltion time I earned in June 2011. The

sabbatical time was never reflected in my vacation

Frostenson. On at least two separate

by

to Mayor Willlch and the Sun Valley City Council), I have provided notice that
shorted my vacation account by the 120 hours,
my vacation accmal account has not

occasions (to Patti

Ms.

been corrected. I am demanding payment of $6,907.80 for the UO hours of norracemed sabbatical
vacation time ii'llt my rurrent pay me of $58.09 per hour;
f) I am demanding payment for $1,642 that Ms. Frostenson shorted my !CMA-RC retirement
account in January 2010 when the initial deposit was made. On at least two separate occasions (to Patti
Ball and to Mayor Wlllich and the Sun Valiey City Cmmdl), I have provided a detailed accounting of the
amounts withheld from my pay

not deposited into my ICMA-RC retirement account totaling $1,642.

I have not been paid this shortage or been provided an explanation .iis to why the shortage occurred. I
am demanding payment of the $1,642 retirement

shortage.

I am demanding that all funds described herein be made by direct deposit in my Chase
{see attached void ched:) as

by 10:00 a.m. Tuesday, January

not make the payment demanded, or

then

wages,

2012. If such is not done, I consider the City Of Sun Valley to be in

violation of the 48 hour payment requirement
to Idaho Statutes

been the practice of payment

Idaho Statutes 45'"6-06. Should the City Of Sun Valley

least full payment of any non-disputed balances due pursuant

City Of Sun

shall
subject to payment for treble damages,
attorney's
and oost:s pursuant w ldaoo Statutes 45-615. Should the City Of Sun Valley dispute the
oa1(mc,~s demanded I demand a written explanation for
categof:V q(oompensation the Citv Of Sun
Valley is disputing and a detail of the
of the calculation of any undisputed bala1m:es actually paid.
0

I am

in

that

without any withholding for

employee related withholdings, ais the payments are a "lump sum.,_,
of the Agreement. Should any withholdings

or any other

related to the termination

are specifically being done

my

authority or approval, and I consider those to also be done in violation of
Statute 45-606. The City
Of Sun Valley will have
a unilateral determination of withholdings from my .:.i:.ri:;,,~~1r1,rs,li'I
without my approval. I

that e

take responsibility for any and all taxes or employmef'llt related

obligations assodated with the payments demanded.

Finally, I have

a Release Pursutmt To

Administrator Employment Ai61w'i:>""1rn"" 1n1r

which complies with the specific language of the
Should the City Of Sun Valley
to
payment of the balances demanded by 10:00 a.m. Tuesday, January 24, 2012 due to any matters related
to signing a release, I
oonsider the City
Sun
to be in violation of Idaho Statutes c+;;;·'U'JQ.

() {J
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City Administrator Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008 between the City Of Sun Valley and

Sharon R.

prepared

then Sun Valley City Attorney Rand Peebles, states as follows:,

"The severance payment herein is intended to be the Employee's sole exdusive remedy for any
and all dalms of damages of any kind arising from a termination without cause and such
severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair

equitable

both parties to this

Agreement. Accordingly, Employee waives her right to bring a claim of any kind for damages
against Employer arising from a termination without cause."

follows:
"I release all claims of damages of any kind! arising

t

the termination of the City

ent by the City Of Sun Valley on January 19, 2011 and for any
S

V lley arising from a termination without ea use".

00

,,--,.
hlri,://mai I.aol .ccmlf35478-2 I l/;10l-Mc11-us/mail/PrintMcssag,c.as

HAMMER 000288

~

From; Kirtlan Naylor <kirt@naylorhales.com>

To: jctonoval <jdonoval@aol.com>
;;:.mJ1ec:t: RE: Lump Sum payment

Date: Fri, Jan 20, 201211:34 am
••·--·----••·------·------W-••••-,,•,-----·--•·-·-----·--~-'>-----w----·-----------·

That won't do. lf our accountants tell us this should be considered salary, the only way we will 1099 is if
there is an indemnification by your client of all taxes and penalties (including the to the City), if the IRS
deems it to be salary.
Also, I just received the signed "release" and demand.

The release language you propose is not adequate. It needs to be identical to the Agreement, which
states: "Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is subject to execution of a release of all claims
against the City of Sun Valley!'

Please revise your release agreement to replace the last paragraph with this language, in order for
payment to be made:
"I release all claims against the City of Sun Valley,"
. /·:,
:p·-,-v,jl
{

"'

'.)

Kirt Naylor

208.947.2070

From: 1qp.119y.1i~•\1ql._<;().!D [m_;i1lto:)_d9n()v~1l1!:3J,19l.com]
Sent: Friday, January 20, 2012 10:37 AM
To: Kirtlan Naylor

Subject: Re: Lump Sum payment

As to her portion - yes.
Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry
From: Kirtlan Naylor <kir t1<1_)n_;,ylorh,1!,~s.rnm>
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2012 10:03:32 -0700
To: jd0novat@i!.ol.CQ.ill<i.do0ovJl@ao!.c9m>
Subject: RE: Lump Sum payment

Will she sign an indemnification If there is deemed to be any tax liability for the City ifthis is deemed
saf ary, requiring withholdings?

Kirt/an G. Naylor
Naylor & Hales, P.C.
950 w. Bannock, Suite 610
Boise, Idaho 83702
Direct 208 947-2070

1f2
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Add

sentence the release, or we will not
is no reason to delay this now. But

she has complied
the $$$" in
44

hands.

sum payment is the consideration fur the release.

The other demanded wages deal with her termination.

are not affected by this

that In orderforthis to be paid direct
City must
with the
Please
no iaterthan the day before at 3:00pm. S01 I encourage you to send the signed revised release soon.

Kirt/an G. Naylor
Dm!!d: 208 947~2070

NAYLOR&. HALES. P.C.
'.!50W1:Sf !iAAOO!",UT, SI QTE 6 to llO!Sf, () 113102

This email is a ~ I oommimk:.11:im
If It was sent ro \IOll mistli~
please ootify me and des'!roV lf!;!lll' aipv.
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at4:03

"idonoval@aol.com" <idonoval@aol.com> wrote:

48
treble
and ~*"'""""-'
Have a good weekend.
Sent from my Verizon Wirakm B ~
From: Kirtlan Naylor <kirt@naylorhales.com>
Date: Sat, 21 Jan 2012 15:35:46 ..0700
To: idoooval@ao!.com<jdonoval@aol. com>
l:JUDMCI:

Re: wnp Sum payment

Why is she not signing it before Wednesday?
<lmage003.pnp
Kirt Naylor

208.947.2070
From: jdonoval@aoi.com [maiito:idonoyal@aol.comJ
Sent: Saturday, January 21, 2012 3:34 PM
To: Kh11an Naylor
Subjed: Re: lump Sum n::in1,m.:>in;t

thinking treble damages
attorney fees. Read
payments. She wiH sign your release on wednesday "'"u"""""'""'"''

can't put limiting
duress. Talk to you on

wednesday.
Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBeny
From: Kirttan Naylor <kirt@nayiorhales.com>

Sat,

2012 15:05:54 -0700

To: jdonoval@aol.com<idonovai@aol.com>

Subject: RE: lump Sum payment

that sentence to the release, or we will not consider that
hold the "'$$$"'
There is no reason to delay this now. But
sum payment is the consideration
release.

(
l of4

The other demanded wages deal with her termination. They are not affected by this issue.

2/10/2012 7:20 J

From: Kirt.Ian Naylor <kil't@l~lomalel...oc,m::,,

To: Kirtlan Naylor <kll•navloml8lei~a:nn>; idonoval <Jl(IOrKMt~aoi.OOl'liP'
RE:
Sum payment

..,..,..,......;4,.

Date: Sat, Jan 21, 2012 4:03 pm
Attaehmemr. Release.pdf (421()

Also, the limiting language is
of the agreement she signed. So, when it says, "receipt of the
severance payment is subject to execution of a release of all claims against the City of Sun Valley," in
essence, the lump sum isn't due until that condition has been met.

quoted the rest of the paragraph, it seems that to quote the rest Is exactly what should

done.

I have attached the acceptable release. If it is not received by 1:00pm Monday, payment wm not be
able to be made by direct deposit.

(also, your release references January

Kirt Naylor

208.947.2070
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RELEASE PURSUANT TO CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
The City Administrator Employment Agreement dated June l, 2008 between the City of Sun
Valley and Sharon Hammer, and as extended by the Extension dated September 17, 2009,
states as follows:
The severance payment herein is intended to be the Employee's sole exclusive
remedy for any and all claims for damages of any kind arising from a termination
without cause and such severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair
and equitable by both parties tot his Agreement Accordingly, Employee waives
her right to bring a claim of any kind for damages against Employer arising from a
termination without cause. Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is
subject to execution of a release of all claims against the City of Sun Valley.

Therefore, pursuant to the language of the City Administrator Employment Agreement, I state as
follows:
"I release an claims for damages of any kind arising from a termination wi1hout cause on January
19, 2012, and all claims against the City of Sun Valley."
Dated this _ _ of January, 2012.
Sharon R. Hammer

James Donov~ Witness

levised

Supplemental Release

http://mail.ao'

u/35478-211/aol-6/en-us/maJ1/Pri..ntl\A...essage.as;

From: jdoooval <jdonovai@aol.com>
To: mfrostenson <mfrostenson@sviadho.org>
Cc: kirt <kirt@naylorhales.com>
;;;:,u&»~11,;;i,; Revised
Supplemental Release

Date: Mon, Jan 23, 20121:48 pm
Attachments: Revised_W4_001.tif {571 K), Suppleroontal_Release_001.tif (266K)

Please see attached. Thank You.
JIM OONOVAL

ofl

~!0/2012 8:02 AM

SUPPLEMENTAL RELEASE PURSUANT TO CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

payment of the severance payment required pursuant to Section 3.A. of the City Administrator
Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008, I release the City Of Sun Valley for any claims defined in
ministrator Employment Agreement as were intended when the City

- ,wz_.

nt Agreement was entered into on June 1, 2008.

'(7 l!T?:,-,:
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of Sun

Payroll Direct Deposit Voucher

Direct Deposit Date

Voucher No.

231202

01/23/2012

Acct Type

Amount

hecking Deposit

Sharon R Hammer
PO Box 1499

66,935.53

Sun Valley ID 83353

Hammer, Sharon R

( 20011 }

PAY PERIOD ENDING

EARNINGS

TITLE
Regular
Overtime
Vacation
Sick Pay
ON-CALL
Misc Pay
Comp Time

Allow/Exp
Deductible
TOTAL GROSS
TOTAL OED

HOURS

32.00
.00
348.88
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

PERIOD
RATE

AMOUNT

58.0900
.0000
58.0900
58.0900
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0000
.0000

i,858.88
20,266.44

60,412.13

82,537.45
15,601.92 -

380.88

66,935.53

NET PAY

YEAR-TO-DATE
HOURS
AMOUNT

192.00
.00
388.88
.00
2.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
582.88

11,153.28

FICA

FWT
22,590.04
32.00
60,862.13

SWT
Annuity
PERSI Ret

95,762.45
20,619.10-

401K & Vol
ICMARETIR
Cr Union
Other Ins
Flex Plans
Misc Ded

75,143.35

TOTAL DED

1,125.00

TITLE

Y-T-D
AMOUNT

Soc Sec
Medicare
PERS! Ret
Health Ins
Dental Ins
Life Insur

5,117.32
1,196.79
193.14

5,917.73
1,383.98
1,208.91
910.00
67.73

TOTAL BEN

7,505.95

10,648.03

4,663.36 8,253.70 2,476.11-

5,392.77 10,352.02 ·
3,275.11 ·

115.81 •

724.88 •

92.94 -

559.26 84.30 •
230.76 •

01<

188.88
376.10
.00

20,619.10-

15,601.92 -

BEGINNING ACCRUED

Vacation
Sick leave
Comp Time

Y-T-D
AMOUNT

PERIOD
AMOUNT

TITLE

BENEFITS

PERIOD
AMOUNT

01/29/2012

DEDUCTIONS

.00
.00
.00

USED

REMAINING

188.88
376.10
.00

.00
.00
.00

7d J{;rf/1hl!tvf
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This information Is being fumiShed to the Internal Revenue Service. Ii you
,income
a negligence
penally
sanction
is laXable
and orO!Jother
fail to
re rt It

~----~OM~B~No~.~
1~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ·
~

1:1 Employer idenlification number {E!N)

Wages, lips, other compensation

'I

82-0294056
c

2

Federal income tax withheld

4

Social security tax withheld

6

Mecficare tax wilhheld

8

Allocated lips

10352.02

94163.25

Employer's name, address, and ZIP cooe

3

Social security wages

5

Macficare wages am;! tips

CITY OF SUN VALLEY

4008.79

95447.39

POB0X416
SUN VALLEY ID 83353

1383.98

95447.39
7 Social security tips

d Control number

1o

9

Dependent care benefits

20011
e Employee's name, address, and ZIP code

SHARON R
PO BOX 1499
SUN VALLEY ID 83353

............

Form

~

-

16 State wages, lips, etc.

Employer's state ID number

ID j000059844-W
.... -

· - - - .......... - - - - - - - ....

iG

~

17 State income tax

94163.25
- - ... -

... -

-

_..,_,. __ - - -

"

-

-

-- -

-

•

-

.. _ _ ., -

Wage and
Statement

Copy C-For EMPLOYEE'S RECORDS (See Notice to
Employee on the back of Copy B.)

.... - - •

...........

12c

C

724.88

-

..... - - - - - . . -

-- -

-- --·

'

20 Locality name

18 Local wages, lips, etc. 19 Local income tax

3275.11
- - .... q

559.26

.•

14 Other

PERSI

15 Slate

12a See Instructions for box 12

Nonqualffied plans

11

HAMMER

.. -

-

-•

-

-

-

-

-

~

-- -

-

.... _

........

• ..

- - - - - - ..

~

_ _ _ _ ,, -

-

.. -
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-
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-

-

.. -

-

-

•

-

-

-

•

-
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Department ol the Treasury-Internal Revenue Service

Safe, accurate,
FAST! Use
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TITLE 6
ACTIONS IN PARTICULAR CASES
CHAPTER 21
PROTECTION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
6-2 0.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT. The legislature
finds, determines
and declares that government constitutes a large proportion of the Idaho
work force and that it is beneficial to the citizens of this state to
protect the integrity of government by providing a legal cause of action
for public employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a
result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule or regulation.
History:
[6-2101, added 1994, ch. 100, sec. 1, p. 227.]

6-2102
SHORT TIT:':.,E.
Public Employees Act."
History:
[6-2102, added !09~

This

act

is

known as

'-""e

f

100, sec. 1, p. 227.]

6-2103.
DEFINITIONS. As used in this
r:
(1)
"Adverse action" means to discharge,
threaten or otherwise
discriminate against an employee in any manner that affects the employee's
employment, including compensation, terms, conditions, location, rights,
immunities, promotions or privileges.
(2)
"Communicate" means a verbal or written report.
( 3)
"Employee" means a person who performs a service for wages or
other remuneration.
( 4)
(a)
"Employer" means the state of Idaho, or any political
subdivision or governmental entity eligible to participate in the
public employees retirement system,
Idaho Code;
(b)
"Employer" includes an agent of an employer.
(5)
"Public body" means any of the following:
(a)
A state officer, employee, agency, department, division, bureau,
board, commission, council, authority, educational institution or any
other body in the executive branch of state government;
(b)
An agency, board, commission, council, institution member or
employee of the legislative branch of state government;
(c)
A county, city, town, regional governing body, council, school
district, special district, municipal corporation, other political
subdivision, board, department, commission, council, agency or any
member or employee of them;
(d)
Any other body that is created by state or local authority, or
any member or employee of that body;
( e)
A law enforcement agency or any member or employee of a law
enforcement agency; and
(f)
The judiciary and any member or employee of the judiciary.
History:
[6-2103, added 1994, ch. 100,

sec. 1, p. 227.

J

renc1e ing
6-2106.
COURT ORDERS FOR VIOLATION OF CHAPTER. A court,
a judgment
under this chapter, raay crcter any or a.11 of the
foll
(1)
An injunction to restrain continued violation of the provisions
of this act;
(2)
The reinstatement of the employee to the same position held
before the adverse action, or to an equivalent position;
(3)
The reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniori
rights;
(4)
The compensation for lost wages, benefits and other remuneration;
( 5)
The payment
the employer of reasonable costs and attorneys'
fees;
( 6)
An assessment of a civil fine of not more than five hundred
dollars ($500), which shall be submitted to the state treasurer for deposit
in the general fund.
.J....1.l

History:
[6-2106, added 1994, ch. 10

1

sec .

"
.Lr

. 228.

6-2107.
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS TO EMPLOYER -- ACTION
WITHOUT BASIS IN LAW OR FACT. A court may also order that reasonable
attorneys' fees and court costs be awarded to an employer if the court
determines that an action brought by an employee under this chapter is
without basis in law or in fact. However, an employee shall not be assessed
attorneys' fees under this section iC after exercising reasonable and
diligent efforts after filing a suit, the employee files a voluntary
dismissal
concerning the
employer,
within a
reasonable time after
determining that the employer would not be liable for damages.
History:
[6-2107, added 1994, ch. 100,. se

1, ;::,

22':L

6-2108.
NO IMPAIRMENT OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT - CONFIDENTIALITY PROTECTED. This chapter shall not be construed
to diminish or impair the rights of an employee under any collective
bargaining agreement, nor to permit disclosures which would diminish or
impair the
rights
of any person to
the
continued protection
of
confidentiality of communications where statute or common law provides such
protection.
History:
[6-2108, added 1994, ch. 100, sec. 1, p. 229.]

6-2109.
NOTICE OF EMPLOYEE
appropriate means to notify its
obligation under this chapter.

PROTECTirn\;.
k1
empioyer
shall
employees of their protection

History:

[6-2109, added 1994, ch. 100, sec. 1 1 p. 229.]

use
and

